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Preface
The Health Systems in Transition (HiT) series consists of country-based reviews that provide a detailed description of a health system and of reform and policy initiatives in progress or under development in a 
specific country. Each review is produced by country experts in collaboration 
with the Observatory’s staff. In order to facilitate comparisons between 
countries, reviews are based on a template, which is revised periodically. The 
template provides detailed guidelines and specific questions, definitions and 
examples needed to compile a report.
HiTs seek to provide relevant information to support policy-makers and 
analysts in the development of health systems in Europe. They are building 
blocks that can be used:
•  to learn in detail about different approaches to the organization, financing 
and delivery of health services and the role of the main actors in 
health systems;
•  to describe the institutional framework, the process, content and 
implementation of health care reform programmes;
•  to highlight challenges and areas that require more in-depth analysis;
•  to provide a tool for the dissemination of information on health systems 
and the exchange of experiences of reform strategies between policy-
makers and analysts in different countries; and
•  to assist other researchers in more in-depth comparative health 
policy analysis.
Compiling the reviews poses a number of methodological problems. In 
many countries, there is relatively little information available on the health 
system and the impact of reforms. Due to the lack of a uniform data source, 
quantitative data on health services are based on a number of different sources, 
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including the World Health Organization (WHO) Regional Office for Europe’s 
European Health for All database, data from national statistical offices, 
Eurostat, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) Health Data, data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators and any other relevant sources 
considered useful by the authors. Data collection methods and definitions 
sometimes vary, but typically are consistent within each separate review.
A standardized review has certain disadvantages because the financing 
and delivery of health care differ across countries. However, it also offers 
advantages, because it raises similar issues and questions. HiTs can be used to 
inform policy-makers about experiences in other countries that may be relevant 
to their own national situation. They can also be used to inform comparative 
analysis of health systems. This series is an ongoing initiative and material is 
updated at regular intervals.
Comments and suggestions for the further development and improvement 
of the HiT series are most welcome and can be sent to info@obs.euro.who.int.
HiTs and HiT summaries are available on the Observatory’s web site (http://
www.healthobservatory.eu).
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Abstract
This analysis of the Armenian health system reviews the developments in organization and governance, health financing, healthcare provision, health reforms and health system performance since 2006.
Armenia inherited a Semashko-style health system on independence from 
the Soviet Union in 1991. Initial severe economic and sociopolitical difficulties 
during the 1990s affected the population health, though strong economic growth 
from 2000 benefited the population’s health. Nevertheless, the Armenian health 
system remains unduly tilted towards inpatient care concentrated in the capital 
city despite overall reductions in hospital beds and concerted efforts to reform 
primary care provision. Changes in health system financing since independence 
have been more profound, as out-of-pocket (OOP) payments now account for 
over half of total health expenditure. This reduces access to essential services 
for the poorest households – particularly for inpatient care and pharmaceuticals 
– and many households face catastrophic health expenditure. Improving health 
system performance and financial equity are therefore the key challenges for 
health system reform. The scaling up of some successful recent programmes for 
maternal and child health may offer solutions, but require sustained financial 
resources that will be challenging in the context of financial austerity and the 
low base of public financing. 

E
xecu
tive su
m
m
ary
Executive summary
Introduction
Armenia is located in the South Caucasus (bordered by Turkey to the west, Georgia to the north, Azerbaijan to the east and the Islamic Republic of Iran to the south) and gained independence from the Soviet Union 
in 1991. Initial severe economic and sociopolitical difficulties during the 1990s 
affected population health, with life expectancy in 2009 relatively low at 70.6 
years for men and 76.9 years for women. Reduced public budgets for health 
care fuelled widespread informal payments for health services. This reinforced 
political and economic pressure to reform the health system, rooted in a desire 
to move away from the centralized, command-and-control system of the Soviet 
era towards a decentralized system.
Growth resumed from 2000 until the global financial crisis reduced demand 
for Armenia’s key exports (metals, chemicals, diamonds and foodstuffs) and 
reduced capital flows into the country, particularly of remittances. The official 
population of Armenia was estimated to be 3.27 million in 2012, but it has been 
estimated that between 1990 and 2005 between 700 000 and 1.3 million people 
(22 – 40% of Armenia’s nominal population) emigrated. While the changing 
global economic climate encouraged some return migration and reduced 
remittances from Armenians abroad, remittances still accounted for 19.5% of 
gross domestic product (GDP) in 2011.
Organization and governance
Following independence, operation and ownership of health services have been 
devolved to provincial/regional and local governments (with the exception of 
the State Hygiene and Anti-Epidemic Inspectorate (SHAEI) and some tertiary 
care hospitals). Devolution of financial responsibility means that individual 
providers now have financial autonomy and are increasingly responsible for 
Health systems in transition  Armeniaxvi
their own budgets and management, including the ability to retain and reinvest 
any profits. The eleven regional governments (ten ‘marzes’ plus the capital city 
of Yerevan), however, continue to monitor the care provided while the Ministry 
of Health formally retains regulatory functions, though effective coordination 
and planning of this decentralized system is still developing. Almost all 
pharmacies, the majority of dental services and medical equipment support 
have been privatized, as have most hospitals in Yerevan.
There are several electronic data collection systems, sometimes overlapping, 
to gather routine information and surveillance data. Nevertheless, there 
are serious data limitations and data gaps which impede the use of health 
information in planning and policy development, and the Ministry of Health is 
implementing e-health reforms in order to establish a universal electronic data 
management system.
Patient empowerment has not been subject to concerted reform efforts; 
consequently, health and health care are recognized as fundamental human 
rights in strategies and other policy documents, but no specific charter of 
patient rights has been introduced. Patient information on provider performance 
in Armenia is limited and difficult to access. The benefits package was initially 
revised annually and this caused great confusion for patients (as services which 
are free one year are available only for a fee the next), though the Ministry of 
Health has been more proactive in seeking to ensure patients are aware of their 
entitlements and are able to exercise choice.
Financing
By international standards, total health expenditure in Armenia is low at 4.3% 
of GDP in 2011 (the average for the WHO European Region was 9.1%). However, 
given the patchy data on funding flows from donor organizations (estimated to 
make up 5.9% of total health expenditure in 2011, down from 17.3% in 2007) 
as well as flows from different Armenian Diaspora groups, it is likely that 
these figures are underestimates. Since independence, publicly funded health 
expenditure has not exceeded 2% of GDP, also low by international standards. 
The Armenian Government currently has limited scope for expanding health 
spending given the fiscal challenges the country faces, particularly since 
the global economic downturn; for 2012, only 1.2% of GDP was allocated 
by the government to the health sector. Health care financing is therefore 
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predominantly financed (57.4% in 2011) by OOP payments; although this 
proportion fell substantially from 75% in 2000, it has been steadily increasing 
since 2008.
Entitlements are defined in the ‘Basic Benefits Package’ (BBP), which is a 
publicly funded package that specifies services that are either fully funded (for 
certain socially vulnerable groups, such as those living in poverty) or partly 
covered; these services include primary care, maternity services, sanitary-
epidemiological services and treatment for around 200 socially significant 
diseases. Emergency services are also covered, but with some co-payments for 
all but the socially vulnerable groups.
OOP payments are made up of formal co-payments for services under 
the BBP, direct payments for services not covered by the BBP (most notably 
hospital care and outpatient pharmaceuticals) and informal payments including 
gratuities. Through the 1990s weaknesses in raising tax meant the gap widened 
between what was nominally covered by the state and what was actually funded, 
and informal payments expanded to fill the gap. Voluntary health insurance 
(VHI) plays a very minor role (0.3% of total health expenditure in 2011).
Physical and human resources
At independence, Armenia inherited an oversized health care system with a 
focus on specialized care. Since then, there has been a rapid contraction in the 
number of hospital beds (from 909 beds per 100 000 population in 1990 to 395 
in 2011) as financing incentives shifted from input to output measures, though 
occupancy rates remain relatively low at 57.3% in 2010. The number of primary 
care facilities also fell following independence from 1686 in 1991 to 997 in 
2004, largely due to the closure of many local health facilities in remote rural 
areas, many of which lacked the most basic facilities. However, the emphasis 
on developing primary care has reversed this trend somewhat, supported by 
substantial investment by donor agencies, and in 2009 there were 1056 primary 
care units nationwide.
Since 1991, the overall Armenian health workforce has contracted. The 
number of specialist doctors and dentists has increased, but the number of nurses 
per capita has fallen substantially. However, while the supply of physicians in 
the health system has remained relatively stable in per capita terms, the balance 
of specialists has not shifted away from hospital services. There is a shortage 
of doctors serving rural areas while there is a surplus in Yerevan. Although 
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they are not recognized within the EU, Armenian medical qualifications are 
recognized across the former Soviet Union, and formal salaries for nurses and 
doctors are considerably higher outside the country; this has led to high levels 
of outmigration of health workers.
Provision of services
The public health system in Armenia is focused primarily on the control 
of communicable diseases under the SHAEI. Health promotion around 
lifestyle issues such as tobacco and alcohol consumption is piecemeal, but 
since reorganization in 2012, the SHAEI is also responsible for the control 
of noncommunicable diseases. The majority of preventive services (including 
immunization) and health promotion activities are integrated with primary care 
services. The Ministry of Health recommends that Armenian citizens have a 
preventive health examination at least once a year, and 19% of men and 25% of 
women did so in the last three years.
The decentralization process of the mid-1990s led to functional disintegration 
of the primary health care system. Utilization of primary care services in 
Armenia has declined more than for hospital care, and outpatient contacts per 
person per year are among the lowest in the WHO European Region. Central to 
recent reforms in primary care in Armenia has been the introduction of family 
medicine as the integrative “first point of contact” organizational principle for 
the delivery of care and the main direction for improving accessibility of care. 
Implementation remains difficult, though, particularly in urban areas where the 
old polyclinic system prevails. The traditional focus on specialist care has posed 
a particular challenge; given the possibility of going directly to a specialist and 
the prevalence of OOP payments in the system, the gate keeping function of 
primary care is weak.
Rehabilitation, long-term and palliative care are not well developed as 
other parts of the health system which affects the system’s overall efficiency. 
Most long-term care is provided within the family and there are few resources 
available for informal carers. Mental health services are sorely lacking, and 
what is available is poorly integrated into the primary care system; there 
is an overcapacity of beds and staff in psychiatric hospitals, leading to the 
unnecessary admission of chronic patients who would be more appropriately 
treated in a community setting.
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There are 17 licensed pharmaceutical manufacturers in Armenia all of which 
specialize in manufacturing generics, and all are working towards compliance 
with standards of Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP). Community pharmacies 
are predominantly private, profit-making enterprises. Geographical access to 
pharmacies in Yerevan and other urban areas is good, but it can be problematic 
in rural areas. Very few outpatient pharmaceuticals are provided through 
the BBP and pharmaceuticals are a major item of household expenditure in 
Armenia (4% of total household expenditure in 2010).
Principal health reforms
In 2006, the BBP was broadened to provide a package of primary care services 
for the whole population that was formally free at the point of use, and funding 
for primary care services was subsequently increased. However, salaries remain 
low; doctors working in primary care and relying solely on their salary after 
taxes would be living close to or even below the poverty line.
In 2008, the Armenian Government introduced the Obstetric Care State 
Certificate (OCSC) to ensure that all women had access to high-quality 
maternity services which were free at the point of use. Pregnant women started 
to receive their OCSCs from July 2008; these are used to pay for care at their 
chosen maternity hospital, with the provider then paid a fixed fee (set by the 
Ministry of Health and reflecting market rates) depending on the complexity 
of the delivery. There was initial opposition from hospital managers and 
obstetricians, but the Programme is now considered a success, particularly 
as OOP costs for deliveries have fallen substantially. The Child Health State 
Certificate (CHSC) Programme was introduced on a similar basis, as the 
insufficient funding of inpatient paediatric services through the BBP meant 
high costs for patients that acted as a significant barrier to care. The introduction 
of the CHSC in 2011 has also been successful in reducing informal payments, 
improving affordability and access to services and boosting patient satisfaction. 
The key factor in the success of the state certificate programmes has been 
their clear political commitment (with the associated financial commitment) to 
covering the full cost of maternity and paediatric services. Their future success 
relies on consistent and transparent funding for service providers which ensures 
them a good salary.
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In February 2011 and in the context of financial austerity, the Armenian 
Government introduced formal co-payments for many adult emergency care 
services. The aim is for these co-payments to increase government revenues 
by ‘formalizing’ informal payments for services and for prices to better reflect 
true costs.
From January 2012, some public sector employees have been eligible to 
receive a voucher to purchase a private health insurance package and other 
cover, which has increased VHI revenues in Armenia by more than four 
times. The stated purpose was to make government employment attractive 
and to address employees’ social needs given their relatively low wages. The 
introduction of the Social Package has raised a fundamental challenge to equity 
in the health system.
In 2011, the Ministry of Health launched a process to define the National 
Health Strategy for Armenia. This was intended to be in place by 2013, and to 
provide a plan for establishing common ground between stakeholders where 
improving the health of the population is given priority, and to establish an 
intersectoral strategy to achieve this end.
Assessment of the health system
OOP payments as a proportion of total health expenditure are comparatively 
high in Armenia and this, in combination with quite high rates of poverty, is 
associated with high rates of catastrophic and impoverishing household health 
expenditure. Even those eligible for the BBP face considerable OOP costs when 
accessing services; limits to the BBP mean that many expensive aspects of 
health care are not covered.
By their very nature, OOP payments are highly regressive as poorer 
households pay a greater proportion of their income for health services than 
richer households. The high share of OOP payments in total health expenditure 
(57.4% in 2011) is therefore the greatest challenge to equity in health system 
financing in Armenia, and means that for many Armenians, seeking health 
care is considered unaffordable. The state certificate programmes have been 
successful in strengthening financial protection, with OOP payments for 
paediatric and maternal health services falling sharply, but other sectors are 
still chronically underfunded. In this context, the new scheme for purchasing 
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private health insurance cover for civil servants and certain other state-sector 
workers is not something which will improve equity in financing; indeed it may 
well have the opposite effect.
Hospital care continues to dominate the national health system, despite 
the reductions in capacity since independence. However, the reductions were 
almost exclusively limited to hospitals outside the capital city, and the estimated 
savings were largely achieved through closure or repurposing of small rural 
hospitals and the reduction of bed numbers in regional and urban hospitals 
through changed financing mechanisms. The inpatient system in Armenia 
remains poorly balanced, with an oversupply of capacity and staff in the capital 
often providing services to patients who would be more appropriately treated 
in day-care or outpatient settings.
The key challenge to greater transparency in the health system is the 
pervasiveness of informal payments. The greater clarity around priorities in the 
health system afforded by the planned National Health Strategy would facilitate 
greater health system performance monitoring and monitoring progress towards 
these goals would build even greater capacity for performance monitoring and 
accountability strengthening in the health system.
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1. Introduction
Armenia is located in the South Caucasus and gained independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, when the country embarked on a rapid  “shock therapy” strategy for economic reform. Armenia is a presidential 
republic with a highly stable political elite. Through the early 1990s, Armenia 
experienced severe economic difficulties but strong economic growth from 
2000 was accompanied by low levels of national debt, reduced poverty rates, 
low inflation and a stable currency. However, the global financial crisis reduced 
demand for Armenia’s key exports (metals, chemicals, diamonds and foodstuffs) 
and reduced capital flows into the country, particularly of remittances.
The de jure population of Armenia was estimated to be 3.27 million in 2012, 
but it has been estimated that in the period from 1990 to 2005 between 700 000 
and 1.3 million people (22–40% of Armenia’s nominal population) emigrated. 
Outmigration has added to a large Armenian Diaspora of over 5 million people, 
but much has also been temporary labour migration (particularly to the Russian 
Federation). While the changing global economic climate encouraged some 
return migration, remittances still accounted for 19.5% of GDP in 2011.
Transition has had a serious and long-term impact on the income and 
well-being of the Armenian population. Life expectancy was relatively 
low, at 70.6 years for men and 76.9 years for women in 2009. In 2012, only 
3% of Armenian women were current smokers while 56% of men were. 
Noncommunicable diseases (particularly cardiovascular diseases) predominate 
as the cause of death in Armenia, but the resurgence of tuberculosis and the 
steady increase in human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infection and the 
acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) are also serious health issues.
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1.1 Geography and sociodemography
The Republic of Armenia is located in the South Caucasus, occupying a territory 
of 29 800 km2. Armenia is bordered by Georgia to the north, Azerbaijan to the 
east, Turkey to the west and the Islamic Republic of Iran to the south (Fig. 1.1). 
It is a mountainous country and has a markedly continental climate with hot 
summers and cold winters. One of the oldest nations in the world, Armenia 
has a rich history and unique culture. At the crossroads of Europe, Asia and 
the Middle East, and situated along the Silk Road, the boundaries, reach and 
regional importance of Armenia have ebbed and flowed over the centuries 
(Payaslian, 2007). The territory that is now Armenia represents part of what 
was historically eastern Armenia. Events of the late 19th and the early 20th 
centuries have left a lasting impression on Armenia and shaped its modern 
borders, which are less than half of Armenia’s former reach.
Fig. 1.1
Map of Armenia 
Source: United Nations, 2013. 
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In the late 1980s, tensions surfaced over Nagorno-Karabakh, which had 
been created as an autonomous territory within neighbouring Azerbaijan in 
1923. In 1991, as the dissolution of the Soviet Union was taking place, the 
people of Nagorno-Karabakh sought to become an independent republic and 
these tensions escalated into a full-scale war over Karabakh in 1992. After two 
years of armed conflict and the mass displacement of hundreds of thousands 
of people, a ceasefire accord was signed between Armenia and Azerbaijan in 
1994. However, the conflict remains unresolved and the status of Nagorno-
Karabakh is not settled. Armenia’s borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey are 
currently closed.
Armenia is an ethnically homogeneous country; approximately 98% of the 
population are Armenian, the remainder being Yezidi (1.3%), Russians (0.5%) 
and Assyrians, Kurds and Greeks (0.1% or less). The official language is 
Armenian, with a unique alphabet. The predominant religion is the Armenian 
Apostolic Church; religious minorities include other Christian denominations, 
Yezidi and others. Approximately 65% of the population live in urban areas with 
approximately one-third, or 1.1 million, living in the capital city of Yerevan 
(Armstat, 2011b, 2012c). Table 1.1 shows some key demographic indicators 
characterizing population dynamics in Armenia.
Table 1.1
Trends in population/demographic indicators, 1990–2011 (selected years)
1990 1995 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Population, total (millions) 3.54 3.22 3.08 3.07 3.07 3.07 3.08 3.08 3.09 3.10
Population, female (% of total) 51.5 52.6 53.0 53.3 53.4 53.4 53.4 53.4 53.5 53.5
Population aged 0–14 
(% of total)
30.4 29.5 25.9 21.9 21.3 20.9 20.5 20.3 20.2 20.2
Population aged 65 and above 
(% of total)
5.6 8.4 10.0 12.0 12.1 11.9 11.6 11.3 11.1 11.0
Population growth (annual %) 0.1 − 2.1 − 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3
Population density  
(people/km2 land area)
124 113 108 108 108 108 108 108 109 109
Fertility rate, total  
(births per woman)
2.5 2.1 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7
Birth rate, crude  
(per 1 000 people)
21.2 16.0 13.3 14.7 15.0 15.1 15.2 15.3 15.3 15.2
Death rate, crude  
(per 1 000 people)
7.7 8.7 8.4 8.4 8.5 8.6 8.7 8.8 8.9 9.0
Age dependency ratio a 56.2 60.9 55.9 51.4 50.2 48.8 47.4 46.3 45.6 45.3
Rural population  
(% of total population)
32.6 33.9 35.3 35.8 35.8 35.9 35.9 35.9 35.9 35.9
Literacy rate, adult total b – – – – – – – – 99.6 –
Source: World Bank, 2013.
Notes: a The age dependency ratio is the ratio of the combined child population (aged 0–14) and the elderly population (aged 65+) 
to the working age population (aged 15–64); b Percentage of people aged 15 and above.
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Between 1988 and 1991, Armenia received approximately 420 000 
refugees (350 000–360 000 from Azerbaijan and the rest from other parts of 
the former Soviet Union) and a total of about 170 000 ethnic Azerbaijanis left 
the country (UNDP Armenia, 2009). This added to the devastating impact of 
the 1988 Spitak earthquake, which was estimated to have left 25 000 people 
dead and some 400 000 homeless. According to estimates from the United 
Nations High Commission for Refugees, by the end of the 1990s there were 
approximately 280 000 ethnic Armenians registered as refugees, some 60 000 
of whom, mostly men, were believed to have left the country (United Nations 
High Commission for Refugees, 2001). The de jure population of Armenia 
was estimated to be 3.27 million in 2012 (Armstat, 2011b, 2012c). It has been 
estimated that between 1990 and 2005 between 700 000 and 1.3 million people 
(22– 40% of Armenia’s nominal population) emigrated (UNDP Armenia, 2009). 
Outmigration has also added to a large Armenian Diaspora of over 5 million 
people, with approximately 2.5–3 million living in other parts of the former 
Soviet Union (largely the Russian Federation) and another 1.5 million in the 
United States, France and the Middle East (mainly in the Islamic Republic of 
Iran) (UNDP Armenia, 2001). However, much of the migration is temporary 
labour migration (particularly to the Russian Federation), and the changing 
global economic climate has encouraged some return migration, which is a new 
development for Armenia (Armstat, 2011b).
1.2 Economic context
The Armenian economy has more or less recovered from the difficulties it 
faced in the immediate aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. From 
2000, the country witnessed strong economic growth with low levels of national 
debt, reduced poverty rates, low inflation and a stable currency. However, the 
global financial crisis reduced demand for Armenia’s key exports (metals, 
chemicals, diamonds and foodstuffs) and reduced capital flows into the country 
(particularly remittances). The narrow export base and business monopolies 
in key imports (fuel and key foodstuffs such as wheat and cooking oil) make 
Armenia particularly vulnerable to external shocks, and in 2009 the country 
experienced a deep recession, with GDP falling by 14.1% (Table 1.2). This put 
pressure on the budget as the need for social spending came at the same time as 
reduced availability of fiscal space; the sharp drop in tax revenues meant that 
the government had to accept large loan packages from the Russian Federation 
and international financial institutions. There was some recovery in 2010 and 
2011, but there has not been a return to the double-digit growth experienced 
Health systems in transition  Armenia 5
previously, and poverty incidence jumped from 27.6% in 2008 to 35% in 2011, 
with extreme poverty reaching 3.7% (Armstat, 2011b, 2012c). Government 
spending on health is discussed in section 3.1.
Table 1.2
Macroeconomic indicators, 1995–2011 (selected years)
1995 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
GDP (current US$, million) 1 468 1 912 4 900 6 384 9 206 11 662 8 648 9 371 10 248
GDP, PPP (current international $, 
million)
4 474 6 264 12 559 14 676 17 178 18 769 16 325 16 785 17 948
GDP per capita (current US$) 456 621 1 598 2 080 2 995 3 787 2 803 3 031 3 305
GDP per capita, PPP (current 
international $, million)
1 388 2 036 4 096 4 781 5 588 6 096 5 292 5 428 5 789
GDP growth (annual %) 6.9 5.9 13.9 13.2 13.7 6.9 − 14.1 2.1 4.6
General government final consumption 
expenditure (% of GDP)
11.2 11.8 10.6 10.1 10.2 10.2 13.3 13.1 11.8
Cash surplus/deficit (% of GDP) – – − 1.0 − 0.3 − 0.6 − 0.5 − 7.6 − 4.9 − 2.7
Tax revenue (% of GDP) – – 14.3 14.4 16.0 17.3 16.5 16.9 17.0
Industry, value added (% of GDP) 32.0 39.0 45.3 44.7 43.9 43.5 35.8 36.0 37.1
Agriculture, value added (% of GDP) 42.3 25.5 20.9 20.5 20.3 18.4 18.9 19.6 20.7
Services etc., value added (% of GDP) 25.8 35.5 33.8 34.9 35.8 38.1 45.3 44.5 42.2
Labour force, total (million) 1.50 1.47 1.44 1.43 1.41 1.40 1.42 1.44 1.45
Unemployment, total  
(% of total labour force)
– – – – 28.4 28.6 – – –
Poverty headcount ratio at national 
poverty line (% of population)
– – – – – 27.6 34.1 35.8 –
GINI index a – – 36.2 32.8 30.2 30.9 – 31.3 –
Real interest rate (%) − 18.9 33.4 14.3 11.4 12.7 10.4 15.8 9.2 13.0
Official exchange rate  
(LCU per US$, period average)
406 540 458 416 342 306 363 374 373
Source: World Bank, 2013.
Notes: LCU: Local currency unit; PPP: Purchasing power parity; a Gini index is a measure of absolute income inequality. The coefficient 
is a number between 0 and 100, where 0 corresponds to perfect equality (where everyone has the same income) and 100 corresponds to 
perfect inequality (where one person has all the income, and everyone else has zero income).
The global financial crisis has also affected labour migration patterns in 
Armenia (see section 1.1). Labour migrants are nearly all men and nearly all go 
abroad for seasonal work: 82% went to the Russian Federation in 2010 where 
they worked predominantly in the construction industry (Armstat, 2011b). In 
2010, 28.2% of the population were living and working abroad, and remittances 
accounted for an estimated 19.5% of GDP in 2011 (World Bank, 2013).
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1.3 Political context
Armenia formally declared its independence from the Soviet Union in 
September 1991. It is a presidential republic; its Constitution was adopted on 
5 July 1995 by referendum, with amendments adopted through a contentious 
nationwide referendum in November 2005 (Council of Europe, 2005). State 
power is exercised pursuant to the Constitution and the laws are based on the 
principle of separation of the legislative, executive and judicial powers. The 
Constitution further designates the President as the Head of State, elected by 
popular vote to a five-year term for no more than two consecutive terms. The 
President appoints the prime minister, and, upon recommendation of the prime 
minister, the members of government and the chief prosecutor. The current 
President of the Republic of Armenia is Serzh Sargsyan, who has been in post 
since February 2008 after serving as Minister of Defence under the previous 
President, Robert Kocharian. The current government is led by Prime Minister 
Tigran Sargsyan (no relation of the President), who was appointed in April 2008.
The legislative branch comprises the unicameral National Assembly 
(Azgayin Zhoghov) whose 131 members (41 elected by direct vote and 90 by 
party list) serve five-year terms. The last parliamentary elections were held in 
May 2012 when the Republican Party (HHK) headed by Serzh Sargsyan won 
69 seats, followed by Prosperous Armenia with 37 seats, the Armenian National 
Congress with 7, Rule of Law Party (Orinats Yerkir) with 6, the Armenian 
Revolutionary Federation (“Dashnak” or ARF) with 5 and the Heritage Party 
with 5. The remaining two seats are held by independent candidates. The 
judicial branch of government is headed by the Judicial Council, presided over 
by the President. The Council comprises 14 members who are appointed by the 
President for a period of five years. Administratively, the country is divided 
into 11 regions (marzes) including the capital city of Yerevan. The regions are 
further divided into rural and urban communities (hamaynqner) and Yerevan 
into 12 districts. The communities are administered by local self-government 
that is elected for a term of four years: this is the council of elders (Avagani), 
and the head of the community. For the purposes of local self-government, 
Yerevan is a single “community” and the Mayor of Yerevan may be either 
directly or indirectly elected. The government has the power to remove the 
head of a community, but only with the backing of the Constitutional Court.
The unresolved conflict over Nagorno Karabakh overshadows politics in 
Armenia. Political decision-making is shaped by the very high priority afforded 
to national defence spending. There is also an overlap between certain political 
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and commercial interests as many industrial leaders are also members of the 
ruling elite, but there is no explicit role for formal lobby groups in the decision-
making process (de Waal, 2010).
Armenia joined the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in 
December 1991. It is a member of the World Bank Group, the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the IMF, the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development and the World Trade Organization (since 
February 2003). Armenia became a member of the United Nations in March 
1992 and a full member of the Council of Europe in January 2001. The 
government has ratified the European Convention on Protection of National 
Minorities (20 July 1998) and the European Convention on Human Rights (26 
April 2002). The country is also a signatory to the United Nations Convention 
on the Rights of the Child (24 September 2003). Upon joining the Council of 
Europe and adopting the corresponding law in 2003, the President appointed 
Armenia’s first Human Rights Defender (Ombudsman) in April 2004. In 
addition, Armenia acceded to the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco 
Control in November 2004 and implementing International Health Regulations 
since June 2007. In 2011, Armenia scored 2.6 on the Corruption Perception 
Index, which has a range of 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (highly clean); the country’s 
score was 3.0 in 2007.
1.4 Health status
Official population estimates are based on the 2001 census data, but they are 
likely to be overestimates as the de jure population figures do not take into 
account the very high levels of undocumented emigration (WHO Regional 
Office for Europe, 2009). The most recent census was conducted in 2011, but 
the data were still being analysed at the time of writing. The overestimating of 
population size is a source of error for mortality and morbidity indicators. It 
was estimated that 68% of adult deaths were registered in 2003, so there has 
also been a problem with the completeness of mortality data (WHO Regional 
Office for Europe, 2009). The accuracy of cause-of-death certification has also 
been highlighted as problematic, particularly outside the capital, and currently 
only 229 causes of death are coded electronically, which means many cases are 
“coded up” to a more general category and the finer detail is lost (WHO Regional 
Office for Europe, 2009).
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Average life expectancy at birth was 73.9 years in 2009, 70.6 for men 
and 76.9 for women (Table 1.3). National statistics showed that average life 
expectancy at birth in 2011 was 70.7 years for men and 77.5 years for women 
(Armstat, 2012b); however, WHO estimates for average life expectancy are 
considerably lower, at 66 years for men and 73 years for women (WHO Regional 
Office for Europe, 2013). The difference can be explained by differences 
between official and estimated infant mortality rates (see Table 1.5, below), 
because WHO incorporates survey date to address under-registration of births 
and infant deaths. Life expectancy at birth in Armenia is considerably higher 
than the average for countries of the CIS (64.7 for men and 74.7 for women in 
2010); however, while Armenians are living longer, they do so in poor health 
(WHO Regional Office for Europe, 2013). Disability-adjusted life expectancy in 
Armenia was 63.1 years for men and just 59.1 years for women in 2007 (WHO 
Regional Office for Europe, 2013).
Table 1.3
Mortality and health indicators, 1990–2009 (selected years)
1990 1995 2000 2003 2008 2009
Life expectancy at birth (years) 72.1 71.2 73.2 73.1 73.7 73.9
Life expectancy at birth, male (years) 68.6 67.3 70.4 70.0 70.4 70.6
Life expectancy at birth, female (years) 75.4 74.9 75.8 75.9 76.8 76.9
SDR all causes, all ages, male (per 100 000) 1288.4 1422.4 1151.4 1349.0 1321.6 1318.2
SDR all causes, all ages, female (per 100 000) 815.8 906.9 831.9 891.1 847.6 847.9
Source: WHO Regional Office for Europe, 2013.
Notes: SDR: Standardized death rate; Data unavailable for 2004–2007.
Broad trends in disease categories show that the leading causes of mortality 
are noncommunicable diseases, particularly cardiovascular diseases and cancer 
(Table 1.4). The leading causes of mortality are the same for men and women, 
but the overall level of mortality is much higher for men than for women. 
Around a quarter of all male deaths in Armenia are smoking related (Perrin, 
Merrill & Lindsay, 2006) and male smoking rates are among the  highest in 
Europe (Movsisyan, Thompson & Petrosyan, 2012 ; Movsisyan et al., 2010). 
A recent lifestyles survey conducted in 2010 found a female smoking rate of 
1.9% and a male smoking rate of 58.9% (Roberts et al., 2012a), and official 
prevalence data for 2012 showed that 55.7% of men and 2.9% of women are 
current smokers (Bazarchyan, 2012). Drinking patterns are similarly gendered. 
In 2005, 56% of women and 16% of men abstained from alcohol in the past 
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12 months (WHO, 2011). Noncommunicable diseases, therefore, predominate 
as the cause of death in Armenia, but the resurgence of tuberculosis and the 
steady increase in HIV infection rates are also serious health issues (Table 1.4).
Table 1.4
Main causes of death, 1990–2009 (selected years)
Causes of death (standardized death rate per 100 000 population) 1990 1995 2000 2003 2009
Infectious and parasitic diseases 12.4 12.7 10.7 8.6 9.2
Tuberculosis 4.0 5.6 5.7 5.6 4.7
AIDS /HIV (as recorded by routine mortality statistics system) – 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4
Diseases of the circulatory system 567.4 654.0 553.3 626.7 532.2
Ischaemic heart disease 374.3 427.1 370.7 387.3 317.5
Cerebrovascular disease 157.2 169.9 149.1 176.8 121.5
Malignant neoplasms 155.8 141.0 153.2 159.2 160.7
Malignant neoplasm of colon, rectum and anus 12.4 10.9 12.3 13.3 13.6
Malignant neoplasm of larynx, trachea, bronchus and lung 38.5 34.0 37.2 35.6 46.1
Malignant neoplasm of breast 14.2 13.4 17.8 16.9 17.9
Malignant neoplasm of cervix uterus, females 7.1 5.7 5.6 6.7 3.6
Diabetes mellitus 23.9 40.5 48.5 61.4 46.5
Mental and behavioural disorders 1.9 5.6 2.3 0.8 0.2
Diseases of the respiratory system 76.1 70.6 57.2 63.4 73.4
Diseases of the digestive system 33.6 38.4 30.4 38.6 59.4
Transport accidents 22.3 8.8 7.0 6.5 5.3
Suicide and intentional self-harm 3.3 4.6 2.2 2.1 1.7
Source: WHO Regional Office for Europe, 2013. 
According to immunization rates derived from information in the health 
system, coverage for the key vaccine-preventable diseases is high, although 
often short of rates that would achieve herd immunity; in 2009, 93% of infants 
were vaccinated with against diphtheria, tetanus and pertussis (combined 
vaccine) and hepatitis B, 94% against poliomyelitis, 96% against measles and 
rubella, and nearly 99% against tuberculosis (WHO Regional Office for Europe, 
2013). Survey-based estimates of immunization rates were lower than those 
given officially. Data from Demographic and Health Survey 2005 estimates 
showed much lower coverage for measles vaccine, by 10 or 20 percentage points 
(Thompson & Harutyunyan, 2009; WHO Regional Office for Europe, 2013). 
However, the findings of the 2010 Survey indicate that coverage has improved; 
these data show that at age 18 months 87.1% of children had received all the 
basic WHO-recommended vaccinations and 92.6% had received their measles, 
mumps, rubella vaccination (Armstat et al., 2012). After concerted efforts, 
Armenia was declared polio free in 2002 and malaria free in 2011. Table 1.5 
outlines the main maternal, child and adolescent health indicators.
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Table 1.5
Maternal, child and adolescent health indicators, 1990–2009 (selected years)
1990 1995 2000 2003 2008 2009
% of all live births to mothers aged under 20 years 12.5 18.3 14.4 13.0 9.5 9.1
Abortions per 1 000 live births 326.7 627.6 343.4 299.8 302.8 310.7
Perinatal deaths per 1 000 births 17.5 15.6 16.3 14.9 14.8 12.7
Neonatal deaths per 1 000 live births – 7.5 9.5 8.1 – –
Postneonatal deaths per 1 000 live births – 6.7 6.3 3.7 – –
Infant deaths per 1 000 live births 18.3 14.2 15.8 11.8 10.7 10.2
Estimated infant mortality per 1 000 live births 46.0 37.0 29.0 – – –
Probability of dying before age 5 years per 1 000 live births 24.2 18.7 19.1 13.4 12.2 12.1
Maternal deaths per 100 000 live births 40.1 34.7 72.9 22.4 38.9 33.8
Syphilis incidence per 100 000 3.7 13.7 8.1 3.9 4.6 4.3
Gonorrhoa incidence per 100 000 31.4 13.7 28.2 23.3 17.6 18.2
Source: WHO Regional Office for Europe, 2013.
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2. Organization and governance
Throughout the 1990s, Armenia underwent a painful period of devastating economic and sociopolitical problems that was accompanied by a decline in the health of the population and put overwhelming strain on the health 
care system. The general economic downturn following independence also 
had an impact on state budgetary resources available for health care, thereby 
fuelling widespread informal payments for health services. This reinforced 
political and economic pressure to reform the health system, rooted in a desire 
to move away from the centralized, command-and-control system of the Soviet 
era towards a decentralized system.
The health system today comprises a network of independent, self-financing 
(or mixed financing) health services that provide both statutory and private 
services. Previously, hospitals had nominal accountability to the local 
administration and were ultimately answerable to the Ministry of Health; they 
now have financial autonomy and are increasingly responsible for their own 
budgets and management, reporting only utilization data to the SHA. Regional 
government, however, continues to monitor the care provided while the Ministry 
of Health formally retains regulatory functions. Almost all pharmacies, the 
majority of dental services and medical equipment support have been privatized, 
as have most hospitals in Yerevan.
Intersectorality in planning and policy development is recognized as 
essential for improving population health, but as is the case elsewhere, it is 
challenging to put in place. There are several electronic data collection systems, 
sometimes overlapping, to gather routine information and surveillance data. 
Nevertheless, there are serious data limitations and data gaps that impede the 
use of health information in planning and policy development. Planning in 
the health system has been oriented away from inputs and capacity indicators 
Health systems in transition  Armenia12
and towards a system that takes account of population size, service utilization 
and available funds. The Ministry of Health initiated the development of the 
National Health Strategy in 2011.
The Ministry of Health is nominally the key regulator of the health system, 
but its regulatory capacity remains quite weak at the facility level. It is the role 
of the Ministry and its subordinated institutions to define and apply national 
health standards and norms, to ensure quality control and to develop as well as 
oversee state-funded programmes.
Patient empowerment has not been subject to concerted reform efforts; 
consequently, health and health care are recognized as a fundamental human 
right in strategies and other policy documents but no specific charter of patient 
rights has been introduced. Similarly, the public are not formally represented 
in decision-making and policy-making bodies. However, the Ministry of Health 
has been proactive in seeking to ensure patients are aware of their entitlements 
and are able to exercise choice.
2.1 Overview of the health system
Following the decentralization and reconfiguration of public services after 
independence (see section 2.4), with the exception of State Hygiene and 
Anti-Epidemic Inspectorate (SHAEI) services and several tertiary care 
hospitals, operation and ownership of primary care services and hospitals 
have been devolved to regional and local governments (Fig. 2.1). Hospitals 
now have financial autonomy and are responsible for their own budgets and 
management. Regional government formally continues to monitor the volume 
of care provided while the Ministry of Health retains regulatory functions. The 
State Health Agency (SHA) acts as the third-party payer, purchasing services 
covered under the Basic Benefits Package (BBP) on behalf of the state (see 
section 3.3.1). Almost all pharmacies, the majority of dental services and 
medical equipment support are privately owned and provided, as are many 
hospitals in Yerevan.
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Fig. 2.1
Overview of the health system 
Source: Author’s own compilation. 
Note: FAP, feldsher /midwife health post.
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2.2 Historical background
At independence, Armenia inherited a Semashko model health system where 
the health facilities were in poor condition, medical equipment and supplies 
were outdated, there was an oversupply and distorted allocation of health care 
workers, primary care was underutilized relative to specialist and hospital 
services and there were substantial inequalities between urban and rural 
infrastructure and resources. Poor financial and management skills of those 
responsible added to inefficient use of limited resources (Hakobyan et al., 2006).
The period of devastating economic and sociopolitical transition in the 
1990s, with the almost complete collapse of prepaid revenue collection and 
the accompanying decline in population health, put overwhelming strain on 
the health care system. The general economic downturn had an impact on 
resources for health care and fuelled the development of a system of informal 
payments for health services. This led to political and economic pressure 
to reform the health system and move away from the centralized Semashko 
system. However, the most compelling force behind health sector reform was 
the impossibility of maintaining the existing health care system in the new 
economic climate. Armenia was simply no longer in a position to continue to 
fund a complex and inefficient system with its unbalanced structure of services 
(Hakobyan et al., 2006).
In 2000, the Ministry of Health proposed the Concept of the Optimization 
of the Health Care System of the Republic of Armenia, subsequently approved 
by the government (Ministry of Health of the Republic of Armenia, 2000). It 
outlined the conceptual approach, methods and mechanisms for optimization. 
In 2001, the Ministry took the lead in developing separate optimization action 
plans for each region. Activities following the 2001–2002 optimization plans 
had some effect in terms of consolidation of excess capacity, with a reduction 
in hospital capacity and in the number of ambulatory-polyclinic facilities (see 
section 4.1). The number of inpatient beds fell from 23 119 to 16 501, or by 
29%. The number of medical personnel, however, did not change significantly 
and capacity reduction was almost exclusively limited to hospitals outside the 
capital, and the estimated savings were largely achieved through the closure of 
small rural hospitals and the reduction of bed numbers in regional and urban 
hospitals (World Bank, 2004). The Yerevan hospital sector was not affected by 
any of the optimization activities (Hakobyan et al., 2006).
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Early health financing reforms in Armenia focused on diversifying revenues 
for the health care sector and linking health care financing to the quality and 
volume of care provided. In view of the limited resources available, financial 
reforms also aimed at advancing financial management and increasing financial 
sustainability and accountability of institutions in the health sector. Therefore, 
in 1997, the government decided to earmark budgetary resources as a means of 
targeting the socially vulnerable population and the so-called socially important 
diseases. The government introduced the BBP, which comprises a publicly 
funded package of services specifying a list of services that are free of charge 
and stipulating the population groups that are entitled to receive any type of 
health care service for free (see section 3.3.1). The BBP has been periodically 
reviewed since, with the range of services and/or population groups covered 
being extended or reduced, depending on the level of funding available. This 
resulted in considerable uncertainty, creating wariness among service users 
and health care providers alike. Experience with the BBP since its introduction 
in 1998 has shown that the allocation of public funds to almost all health 
care facilities does not guarantee medical care free of charge because of the 
occurrence of OOP payments for care (see section 3.4).
2.3 Organization
The health care system is divided into three administrative layers: national 
(republican), regional and municipal or community. Following the 
decentralization and reconfiguration of public services after independence, 
with the exception of the SHAEI and several tertiary care hospitals, operation 
and ownership of health services have been devolved to provincial/regional 
and local governments.
The health system today comprises a network of independent, self-financing 
(or mixed financing) health services that provide statutory services and private 
services. Where formerly hospitals had nominal accountability to the local 
administration and were ultimately answerable to the Ministry of Health, they 
now have financial autonomy and are increasingly responsible for their own 
budgets and management. Regional government, however, continues to monitor 
the care provided while the Ministry of Health retains regulatory functions. 
Almost all pharmacies, the majority of dental services and medical equipment 
support have been privatized, as have most hospitals in Yerevan.
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Ministry of Health
The responsibilities of the Ministry of Health have changed considerably since 
independence. Previously, the Ministry was responsible for all the planning, 
regulation, financing and operation of health services. However, it has gradually 
reduced some of these functions and activities and has assumed a wider 
coordinating role and increased its role in developing national health policy in 
line with country priorities: defining strategies to achieve objectives, defining 
and applying national health standards and norms, ensuring quality control 
and developing and overseeing state-funded programmes. Policy objectives are 
achieved through shared responsibilities with regional and local governance 
bodies and health institutions. Overarching objectives are to increase the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the health care system and to protect and 
improve the health of the population. The Minister of Health is appointed by 
the President and approved by parliament.
As noted above, the Ministry of Health has a number of explicit 
responsibilities, including:
• developing and implementing national health care policy;
• developing and implementing government-supported health programmes 
(e.g. for tuberculosis, diabetes, immunization and disease prevention, 
blood banking, forensic medicine and others);
• developing draft legislation and health regulation papers, standards 
and by-laws;
• human resource planning and development;
• epidemiological and environmental health monitoring and infectious 
disease control to protect the population’s health;
• collecting and reporting health statistics;
• coordinating health-related initiatives and activities (e.g. HIV prevention 
and control, drug use control, health promotion campaigns, health 
programmes in schools) in cooperation with other state ministries, 
agencies, governmental and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) 
and entities; and
• licensing health care-related organizations and private entities, 
pharmaceutical entities and other relevant providers.
In addition, the Ministry of Health is responsible for directly financing and 
managing a number of health care facilities that remained subordinate to the 
Ministry of Health following decentralization (see section 2.4). The Ministry 
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of Health is also responsible for the network of the country’s sanitary and 
epidemiological services that in 2002 were reorganized as the SHAEI under 
the Ministry of Health (see section 5.1).
SHA
The SHA was established in 1998 as a purchaser of publicly financed health care 
services as a part of reforms intended to lay the foundations for the introduction 
of a national social health insurance system. The SHA maintains a central office 
in Yerevan but also has a capital city department and 10 regional branches in 
every region of the country. Although it was initially created as an independent 
semi-governmental organization, in 2002 the SHA was transferred to the 
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Health. The SHA has a mandate to monitor the 
effective utilization of state budgetary allocations received from the Ministry 
of Finance. It is responsible for the allocation of financial resources, based on 
annual contracting mechanisms with health care provider organizations (see 
section 3.3.4). However, it remains a payer rather than an active purchaser.
SHAEI
The SHAEI is responsible for protecting public health and is the successor to the 
sanitary-epidemiological system inherited from the Soviet era (see section 5.1 
for more details).
Other ministries
Important stakeholders include the following.
Ministry of Finance. This plays a critical role in the verification and adoption 
of health sector budgets. It is also responsible for the collection and 
disbursement of tax revenues, serving both the Ministry of Health and 
the SHA.
Ministry of Education. Responsibility for graduate and postgraduate medical 
education including nursing education and continuous medical education 
is shared between this Ministry and the Ministry of Health.
Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. This is responsible for the protection 
of the most vulnerable segments of the population and, in conjunction 
with the Ministry of Health, is responsible for providing care for the 
elderly, refugees, veterans, the disabled and others.
Ministry of Emergency Situations. This Ministry was founded in 2008 
and collaborates closely with the Ministry of Health to implement 
International Health Regulations and disaster risk reduction.
Health systems in transition  Armenia18
Regional / local government
Following the restructuring of Armenian local government, there are now 
11 regional governments (10 regions and the city of Yerevan) that have taken 
over responsibilities for health care. Initially, the regional governments were 
responsible for funding local health care services. This function was, however, 
transferred to the SHA in 1998. Nevertheless, while regional governments are 
no longer directly involved in the financing of health care institutions, they 
retain certain planning and regulatory powers in the general governance of 
health care services.
Regional and local governments do not have to report to the central 
government; however, they should comply with national orders and policies 
set by the Ministry of Health, in particular those related to the control of 
infectious diseases, through negotiated procedures and processes. Therefore, 
local government activities in the health care sector remain visible to the 
Ministry of Health, although lines of accountability are opaque and there 
are few direct monitoring and evaluation activities. There is still a degree of 
accountability of regional health care institutions to regional government in 
that they have to report on funded activity; however, hospitals and polyclinics 
are increasingly autonomous.
Professional organizations
There are over 40 professional medical associations, including the Armenian 
Medical Association, founded in 1992, the Armenian Youth Medical Association, 
and the Armenian Dental Association as well as the Nurses Association, 
founded in 1996. There is often a duplication of associations whereby several 
organizations cover identical areas of expertise; for example, there are both the 
Armenian Public Health Association and the Armenian Public Health Alliance. 
However, with the possible exception of some medical specialist associations, 
these associations have not played a noticeable role in decision-making. There 
has been a move towards increasing the role of professional organizations 
particularly in licensing and registration as well as in postgraduate education, 
but this was not supported by the government. Trade unions in the health care 
sector are rather weak, offering little protection to doctors and nurses, who 
are now able to negotiate individual contracts with their employers, be they 
a hospital or polyclinic director. This is particularly a problem in the private 
sector where employment rights have been undermined frequently.
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Voluntary organizations, NGOs, international donors and multilateral 
organizations
There are numerous NGOs that currently operate or support health-related 
programmes and activities in Armenia. Some are broad based while others 
target specific populations and/or health problems. In addition to the various 
voluntary organizations and NGOs, several international and multilateral 
governmental organizations are supporting a range of programmes in the 
health sector.
2.4 Decentralization and centralization
The health sector reforms that have been introduced since independence have 
led to a marked decentralization of the health care system although central 
government has retained considerable authority. Decentralization was realized 
mainly through devolution of responsibility for service provision in primary 
and secondary care from central level to regional/local health authorities and of 
financial responsibility from governmental to facility level as well as through 
the privatization of facilities.
Devolution
In 1996, responsibility for the provision of primary and secondary care was 
transferred to regional and local governments. While the Ministry of Health 
remained responsible for tertiary-level institutions, most hospitals and 
polyclinics became the responsibility of governments at the regional level. In 
1998, the responsibility for some rural outpatient clinics was transferred to 
governments at the community level. There has been some concern that rural 
areas were given too much authority and the government has sought to partially 
reverse this decentralization process. Budgetary health facilities were given the 
status of state health enterprises financed in accordance with the volume of 
services provided, and in 1998 became state-owned joint-stock companies with 
the state or local government acting as the single owner of facilities. Overall, the 
relationship between state-owned health care facilities and their governmental 
owners remains poorly defined, as does the legal status of health care facilities. 
There is a lack of basic agreements and coordination mechanisms between local 
health authorities and service providers.
Hospital and polyclinics are responsible for managing their financial 
resources, setting prices for services not included in the state-funded health care 
package, deciding on staffing mix and setting terms and conditions of service. 
They are also permitted, within the limits of tax legislation, to retain any profits 
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generated and invest surplus income as they see fit. They contract with central 
government to provide services included in the BBP although they have no 
authority in deciding on the price or volume of services paid for by the statutory 
system. They also have the right to negotiate and sign contracts with insurance 
companies and/or enterprises wishing to purchase health care, although this 
has yet to happen in practice. Moreover, primary care facilities (polyclinics) 
were freed from hospital administrative supervision; although there were 
subsequent mergers of Yerevan-based polyclinics and hospitals into medical 
centres. The decentralization process has expanded institutional autonomy and 
administrative rights and responsibilities. Initially, administrators and health 
care providers lacked many of the necessary skills for the execution of delegated 
functions. However, all hospitals now follow international accounting standards 
and hospital administrators have undergone extensive management training as 
part of international aid programmes. The main challenge for such a devolved 
system is ensuring that adequate accountability and performance-monitoring 
mechanisms are in place.
Privatization
Privatization of elements of the former state-run health system officially began 
in the mid-1990s. The initial focus of privatization was service delivery and 
financing. The privatization of service delivery was accomplished through the 
transfer or sale of government facilities to individuals or groups and through 
changes to the legislative framework that allowed entrepreneurs to establish 
private practices including in the health care sector. Existing legislation does 
not formally regulate the status, structure and services provision of private 
health facilities; the only requirement is the permission (licence) for operation 
issued by the Ministry of Health. In a poorly regulated environment, an 
unofficial private system has developed throughout the state-funded system, 
through institutionalized informal payments. The government’s approach 
to the privatization of health care facilities was specified in the Concept of 
the Strategy of Privatization of Health Care Facilities (Ministry of Health 
of the Republic of Armenia, 2002). In the document, it was stressed that the 
government does not aim to gain financially from privatization and a series of 
policy objectives were set out, including:
• to improve transparency of financial flows in the health care sector;
• to mobilize additional financial resources through private 
sector investments;
• to enhance the effective and efficient use of resources in the health 
care sector;
Health systems in transition  Armenia 21
• to increase the quality and diversity of services and providers; and
• to expand choice for health care users and facilitate a competitive 
environment.
The document also identified several types of health care service and 
provider that would not be open to full privatization. These include the 
majority of urban and rural primary care facilities, the SHAEI services, 
infectious disease hospitals, national blood services and the network of forensic 
medicine commissioner departments, among others. Over 200 formerly state-
owned health care institutions have now been privatized – mostly former state 
pharmacies and medical equipment services as well as dental polyclinics – and 
in these sectors the privatization of facilities is now complete. Nearly all of 
the hospitals in Yerevan have now also been privatized, but it was carried 
out without strategic vision with regard to rationalizing inpatient service 
configuration and commitment for investment and it has created significant 
impediments to hospital consolidation in the capital while contributing to 
fragmentation and inefficiency (see section 4.1). Overall, decentralization 
and privatization steps were not accompanied by strengthened regulation and 
supervision arrangements. This has raised concerns about possible financial 
mismanagement and the fulfilment of social functions (World Bank, 2004).
2.5 Planning
Approaches to planning in the Armenian health care system have evolved from 
a centralized model characteristic of the Semashko system into a segmented 
vertical system of planning that essentially originates from the parliament 
through to the Republican Government and Ministry of Health down to 
regional departments of health and social protection to facility and, ultimately, 
community level. This structure has yet to develop the requisite horizontal 
linkages and structures to enable efficient and decentralized coordination. 
Regional governments and their health departments generally tend to have little 
input into planning activities (Hakobyan et al., 2006).
With the establishment of the SHA, planning in the health system has been 
oriented away from inputs and capacity indicators and towards a system that 
takes account of population size, service utilization and available funds (see 
Chapter 3). However, there is no specific national health policy or planning 
agency to use health information and evidence to provide advice and support to 
the Ministry of Health leadership. There are a number of strategies for priority 
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areas such as maternal and child health, but the targets set in these strategies 
have historically often been so vague that, for example, target percentage 
reductions are given but no baseline data are provided (WHO Regional Office 
for Europe, 2009).
Human resources planning is incidental and largely left to health facilities; 
at the national level, the Ministry of Health has sought to control the oversupply 
of clinical staff by restricting the number of state-funded places in the Yerevan 
State Medical University in coordination with the Ministry of Education, but 
beyond this, strategic planning to ensure the right mix and balance of primary 
care practitioners and various specialists has not yet been introduced (see 
section 4.2). The approach to infrastructure planning has focused on trying to 
rationalize the health system and reduce the oversupply of facilities in urban 
areas (see section 4.1).
After International Health Regulations were brought into force in 2007, 
collaboration between the Ministry of Health and structures dealing with 
emergency situations (particularly the Ministry of Emergency Situations) 
has increased dramatically. In addition to taking over the role of National 
Focal Point for International Health Regulations, a special department within 
the Ministry of Health was established to be responsible for coordination of 
activities with the Ministry of Emergency Situations in the area of disaster risk 
reduction. The Ministry of Health is also represented in the National Disaster 
Risk Reduction Platform, which was established in 2011 and is leading the 
thematic technical group on health, although the lines of responsibility are not 
always clearly delineated between different actors.
2.6 Intersectorality
Health impact assessments are not a routine feature of policy-making in other 
ministries and the barriers to such collaboration, particularly with regard to data 
sharing, are considerable (WHO Regional Office for Europe, 2009). However, 
there are pockets of good practice in some areas that demand significant 
intersectoral collaboration, such as pandemic influenza preparedness. The 
Food Safety and Veterinary State Inspection under the Ministry of Agriculture 
works closely with the SHAEI under the Ministry of Health for the control of 
zoonoses, and these ministries have collaborated well for a number of years 
(World Bank, 2010).
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2.7 Health information management
The main institutions involved in data collection and management in 
Armenia are the National Health Information Analytical Centre (NHIAC), 
which collects and collates routine data from public and private health facilities; 
the SHA, which is responsible for collecting information from contracted 
health care facilities about their activities and finances; the National Statistical 
Service (Armstat), which has a Department of Demography and Census that is 
responsible for the decennial census and the classification of deaths according 
to the WHO International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related 
Health Problems 10th revision (ICD-10), a Department of Household Surveys 
and the Department of Civil Status Registry manages the vital registration 
system. Health information management systems are in place to measure the 
key demographic and health trends. The vital registration system and decennial 
census are used to track population shifts. Regular population-based surveys 
are used to monitor household health expenditure and health risk factors, and a 
routine data collection system tracks dynamics in health service provision and 
access (WHO Regional Office for Europe, 2009).
There are several electronic data collection systems, sometimes overlapping, 
to gather routine information and survey data (Armenian et al., 2009). 
Nevertheless, there are serious data limitations and data gaps that impede the 
use of health information in planning and policy development. Vital registration, 
previous census data and cause-of-death certification are all problematic 
(see section 1.4). Routine reporting from health facilities is also in need of 
improvement, for example the NHIAC facility database does not include all 
private facilities (WHO Regional Office for Europe, 2009). Annual reporting 
forms for facilities are numerous and burdensome; for example, the SHA and 
NHIAC collect some of the same information from hospitals on different 
reporting forms. Consequently, the information being reported needs to be 
updated, streamlined and reported more frequently to support planning and 
policy-making. There are also no current mechanisms for the verification 
of data quality by an independent entity. Routine hospital financial data are 
fragmented and incomplete, and they are not systematically collected from 
non-contracted hospitals (WHO Regional Office for Europe, 2009). Household 
surveys are numerous, but there are substantial differences in sample and 
questionnaire designs that limit the comparability of estimates derived from 
the survey findings.
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Finally, data access has been highlighted as problematic: although access 
to microdata is possible in principle, in practice it is difficult. Metadata and 
microdata are not documented and archived according to international standards, 
nor are they readily shared among institutions or with researchers (WHO 
Regional Office for Europe, 2009). For this reason, the Ministry of Health is 
implementing e-health reforms as part of overall e-governance reforms in the 
country in order to establish a universal electronic data management system.
2.8 Regulation
The Ministry of Health is formally the key regulator of the health system, but 
its regulatory capacity remains quite weak at the facility level. It is the role 
of the Ministry and its subordinated institutions to define and apply national 
health standards and norms, to ensure quality control and to develop as well 
as oversee state-funded programmes (Hakobyan et al., 2006). The Ministry of 
Health initiated the development of the National Health Strategy in 2011 with 
WHO support; it is hoped that the National Health Strategy will be in place in 
2013, but it has not yet been finalized.
2.8.1 Regulation and governance of third-party payers
The regulation of third-party payers is centralized under the Ministry of 
Health because the SHA performs the role of a third-party payer, pooling and 
allocating public funds, and allocates more than 80% of public health care 
resources (Hakobyan et al., 2006). The SHA has been under the direct control 
of the Ministry of Health since 2002 and the limited decision-making authority 
of the SHA to use selective contracting or to reallocate funds means that they 
are bound to follow the defined statutory benefit packages and the purchasing 
plans provided. The regulation of voluntary health insurers is the responsibility 
of the Ministry of Finance, which regulates all financial activities, including 
all types of insurance.
2.8.2 Regulation and governance of providers
The Licensing Agency under the Ministry of Health is the sole body responsible 
for licensing all health care facilities in both the public and private sector. 
Physicians are not licensed. The licensing procedure for facilities is formally 
the same regardless of ownership and the requirements vary depending on the 
services to be provided according to standards set by the Ministry of Health, 
many of which are unchanged since Soviet times. There have been moves to 
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improve the transparency of the licensing process; for example, the standards 
and list of required documents and so on are now made freely available online. 
Previously, it was much more difficult for potential private providers to find 
out what was needed in order to obtain a licence, which gave more scope for 
the soliciting of informal payments. Licensing and inspection functions have 
also now been separated as an anticorruption measure.
Formally, if the SHAEI finds facilities to be in breach of their licence they 
are able to approach the Licensing Agency and request the facility has its licence 
removed, although it is not clear if any facilities have ever lost their licence.
2.8.3 Registration and planning of human resources
There is no formal system of registration of qualified medical practitioners, 
except for the annual registration of all graduates from medical schools and/or 
colleges. The mandatory five-year relicensing term for all medical specialists 
has been suspended for some time. Armenia’s training programmes in health 
care do not conform to EU standards, thus making it difficult to support mutual 
recognition of qualifications. However, the Ministry of Health initiated the 
development of a National Strategy for Human Resources for Health in 2012 
and the strategy should become an integral part of the overall National Health 
Strategy (see section 2.5). The registration, planning and distribution of human 
resources for health will all be addressed in the document.
2.8.4 Regulation and governance of pharmaceuticals
The body responsible for the regulation of pharmaceutical products is the 
Scientific Centre of Drug and Medical Technology Expertise (SCDMTE) under 
the Ministry of Health. The SCDMTE is self-financing and raises revenues 
from fees for services provided, mainly applications for the registration (market 
authorization) of pharmaceutical products. The SCDMTE has four inspectors 
to cover all the pharmaceutical retailers, wholesalers and manufacturers in 
Armenia. An inspection is a prerequisite for the compulsory licensing of 
pharmacies and wholesalers, and the requirements are the same for private and 
state entities. There is a laboratory for quality control testing and government 
inspectors undertake postmarketing surveillance testing, although from 2008 
to 2010 only 18 samples were taken for testing and of these seven failed to 
meet quality standards (Ministry of Health of the Republic of Armenia, 2010). 
Pharmacovigilance is also the responsibility of the SCDMTE, which formally 
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monitors adverse drug reactions. From 2008 to 2010, 143 adverse drug reactions 
were reported out of a total of 519 reports included in the database held by the 
SCDMTE (Ministry of Health of the Republic of Armenia, 2010).
As Armenia is a member of the World Trade Organization (see section 1.3), 
patent laws and other national legislation have been adapted to fit with the 
TRIPS Agreement, once the transitional period ends in 2016. There is legal 
provision for compliance with Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP), and local 
GMP is being harmonized with EU GMP requirements. In 2008, three domestic 
manufacturers were GMP audited and certified under the International 
Organization for Standardization, but GMP compliance was expected of all 
pharmaceutical manufacturers in Armenia by January 2013.
There are no legal or regulatory provisions affecting the pricing of medicines 
and the government does not run an active national medicines price-monitoring 
system for retail prices; medicinal products are subject to 20% value added 
tax (VAT). Prices in private pharmacies (which predominate) are high by 
international comparison and unaffordable to most households (Ministry 
of Health of the Republic of Armenia, 2010). Very few pharmaceuticals are 
provided through the BBP (see section 5.6). The cost of pharmaceuticals is a 
significant factor in the irregular treatment of long term conditions such as 
hypertension (Roberts et al., 2012b).
National Standard Treatment Guidelines for the most common conditions 
were updated in 2006 and cover primary, secondary and paediatric care. The 
national Essential Medicines List was updated in 2007 and includes 293 
medicines, which were selected according to established procedures. There is 
no national programme or committee to monitor or promote the rational use of 
medicines, and there is no written national strategy on antimicrobial resistance. 
Generic substitution at the point of dispensing is allowed, but prescribing by 
the international nonproprietary name is not obligatory in the private or public 
sector. Rational prescribing practices do not have a significant impact because, 
although officially against the law, both antibiotics and injectable medicines 
are sold over the counter without a prescription.
2.8.5 Regulation of medical devices and aids
There is no standard mechanism for purchasing medical devices and aids 
or controls on acquisition. Purchasing for medical devices and aids is not 
centralized and is the responsibility of individual facilities.
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2.9 Patient empowerment
2.9.1 Patient information
Patient information on provider performance in Armenia is limited and difficult 
to access. The lack of an integrated quality assurance system also means that 
information on the quality of health services is not generally available. The 
government has been much more proactive in trying to ensure patients have 
a clear sense of the benefits to which they are entitled. In response to severe 
fiscal constraints, the Armenian Government limited the benefit package to 
the general population (restricting it to primary care and public health services) 
and allowing access to key outpatient and inpatient services for particularly 
vulnerable groups either free of charge or at a reduced rate (see section 3.3.1). 
The BBP used to be revised annually and this caused great confusion for 
patients (as services that were free one year would only be available for a 
fee the next). The Ministry of Health distributes posters and leaflets targeting 
particular vulnerable groups to inform them of their entitlements and the 
Ministry requires such posters to be displayed at the entrance to health facilities, 
but facilities still charged informal fees for services that should be free of charge 
(see section 3.4.3). To combat this, state certificate programmes have been 
developed in key areas such as maternity care and child health (see section 6.1). 
Since 2000, there has also been a “hotline” service where members of the public 
can raise concerns or make request direct to the Minister and the Ministry has 
sought to collaborate with mass media to raise awareness.
2.9.2 Patient choice
Formally, patients have had the right to choose their health care provider since 
the introduction of the Health Care Law in 1996; in practice 90% of Armenians 
are still assigned to their local primary care provider according to residence 
(Armstat et al., 2012). A survey conducted in 2010 found that 58% of women and 
38% of men were registered with a primary care physician (Armstat et al., 2012). 
Given that patients generally choose to avoid the primary care level altogether 
and self-refer to a specialist directly, low enrolment rates are unsurprising (see 
section 5.3). However, there is variation by age and place of residence – rural 
residents are much more likely to be registered with a primary care physician 
than urban respondents and the likelihood also increased with age.
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2.9.3 Patient rights
Health and health care are recognized as a fundamental human right in 
strategies and other policy documents, although no specific charter of patient 
rights has been introduced.
2.9.4 Public participation
The public are not formally represented in decision-making and policy-making 
bodies. Patient satisfaction surveys have been conducted and show high levels 
of satisfaction. One survey of primary care in two regions found that 78% of 
respondents considered the care they received to be “excellent” or “good” with 
less educated respondents and those living in rural areas reporting the highest 
satisfaction (Harutyunyan et al., 2010b). However, this has been taken as 
evidence that different tools are needed to guide quality improvement strategies 
for primary care in Armenia, because these high levels of patient satisfaction 
actually reflected lower expectations rather than higher quality (Harutyunyan 
et al., 2010a).
According to data from the Health in Times of Transition survey, undertaken 
in 2010 in nine countries of the former Soviet Union, approximately 53.8% of 
respondents reported being rather or definitely satisfied with the health system 
in Armenia, which is high compared with other countries of the former Soviet 
Union and much improved since the previous survey in 2001 which found that 
just 29.5% were satisfied (Footman et al., 2013).
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3. Financing
In international comparison, total health expenditure in Armenia is low, at 4.3% of GDP in 2011. Since independence, public health expenditure as a percentage of GDP has not exceeded 2%, which is also very low in 
international comparison. The Armenian Government currently has limited 
scope for expanding health spending given the fiscal challenges the country 
faces, particularly since the global economic downturn; for 2012, only 1.2% 
of GDP was allocated by the government to the health sector. The share of 
public sector expenditure in total health expenditure reached its lowest point 
at 18.1% in 2000, but it increased rapidly from that time, peaking at 44.5% in 
2008 (Table 3.1). Since independence, health care financing has, therefore, been 
dominated by OOP payments; although the proportion fell substantially after 
2000, it has been steadily increasing since 2008. The role of external funding 
for health has fluctuated since independence. One of the challenges faced by 
the Ministry of Health has been to coordinate funding flows from various 
donor organizations as well as flows from different Armenian Diaspora groups. 
Given these challenges, it is unlikely that the full impact of these flows has been 
captured in the data.
Entitlements are defined in the BBP, which is a publicly funded package that 
specifies the services that are either fully or partially subsidized (primary care, 
maternity services, sanitary-epidemiological services and treatment for around 
200 socially significant diseases). Emergency services are also covered, but 
with co-payments for all but specific “vulnerable groups”. Extensive coverage 
is provided through the BBP, which is available to specific segments of the 
population such as households living in poverty, pensioners and children 
(although the ages covered can vary). The SHA is the third-party payer that 
pools and allocates public funds by contracting with health care providers for 
the delivery of the BBP. Resources from OOP payments are by their nature not 
pooled, and they are made up of formal co-payments for services under the BBP, 
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direct payments for services not covered by the BBP (most notably outpatient 
pharmaceuticals) and informal payments, including gratuities. Voluntary health 
insurance (VHI) played a very minor role, but this could change from 2012 
because of a government programme that offers state-funded private health 
insurance cover for certain state employees.
3.1 Health expenditure
The exact level of total health expenditure in Armenia is difficult to determine. 
Legislation does not require the systematic collection of comparable data, and 
existing data collection systems are fragmented (see section 2.7). According 
to WHO estimates, public health expenditure as a percentage of GDP has not 
exceeded 2% since independence (Table 3.1). The Armenian Government 
currently has limited scope for expanding health spending given the fiscal 
challenges the country faces (see sections 1.2 and 3.3.2), so any increases in 
health spending would need a substantial increase in the priority accorded to 
health in public spending. By 2006, the Armenian Government had devoted 
more than twice its budget to health compared with the year 2000 (Kutzin & 
Jakab, 2010), but the global economic downturn has had an impact and for 2012, 
only 1.2% of GDP was allocated by the government to the health sector. 
Total health expenditure as a share of GDP has steadily increased in countries 
of the EU and it has remained relatively stable in countries of the CIS; however, 
it fell in Armenia from 2000 to 2008, which is indicative of the relatively low 
political priority it is afforded (Fig. 3.1). In international comparison, whichever 
estimates are used, total health expenditure in Armenia is low (Fig. 3.2). This 
trend is also reflected in total health expenditure per capita (purchasing power 
parity) (Fig. 3.3).
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Table 3.1
Trends in health expenditure in Armenia, 1995–2011 (selected years)
1995 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
THE per capita ($), 
WHO estimates
90 128 199 200 217 230 242 240 250
THE (% GDP), WHO estimates 6.4 6.3 4.9 4.2 3.9 3.8 4.6 4.5 4.3
Public sector health 
expenditure (% THE), 
WHO estimates
31.0 18.1 30.4 38.0 41.6 44.5 43.5 40.5 35.8
Private sector expenditure 
on health (% THE), 
WHO estimates
69.0 81.9 69.6 62.0 58.4 55.5 56.5 59.5 64.2
Public sector expenditure on 
health (% total government 
expenditure), WHO estimates
8.3 4.6 6.8 7.4 6.8 7.2 6.6 6.4 5.8
Public sector expenditure 
on health (% GDP), 
WHO estimates
2.0 1.1 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.7 2.0 1.8 1.5
Private household OOP 
payment on health (% THE)
65.9 77.1 66.6 66.6 54.8 51.8 52.5 55.2 57.4
Private household OOP 
payment on health (% private 
sector health expenditure)
95.5 94.2 95.7 93.1 93.9 93.4 92.9 92.7 89.4
VHI (% THE) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3
VHI (% private expenditure 
on health)
0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5
Source: WHO, 2013.
Notes: PPP, Purchasing power parity; THE: Total health expenditure; VHI: Voluntary health insurance.
Fig. 3.1
Trends in total health expenditure as a share (%) of GDP in Armenia and selected 
other countries, 1995–2010 
Source: WHO Regional Office for Europe, 2013.
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Fig. 3.2
Total health expenditure per capita (US$ PPP) in the WHO European Region, 
WHO estimates, 2010 
Source: WHO Regional Office for Europe, 2013.
Note: TFYR Macedonia: The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. 
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Fig. 3.3
Total health expenditure as a share (%) of GDP in the WHO European Region, 
WHO estimates, 2010 
Source: WHO Regional Office for Europe, 2013.
Notes: PPP$: Purchasing power parity in US dollars; TFYR Macedonia: The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
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Fig. 3.4
Public sector health expenditure as a share (%) of total health expenditure in the 
WHO European Region, WHO estimates, 2010 
Source: WHO Regional Office for Europe, 2013.
Note: TFYR Macedonia: The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
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Public sector expenditure as a share of total health expenditure was 40.6% 
in 2010, which is low for countries of the WHO European Region; however, 
this is substantially higher than in Armenia’s Caucasian neighbours Georgia 
and Azerbaijan (Fig. 3.4). The share of public sector expenditure in total health 
expenditure reached its lowest point at 18.1% in 2000, but it increased rapidly 
from that time, peaking at 44.5% in 2008 (WHO Regional Office for Europe, 
2013). Government health expenditure by service is greatest for inpatient 
services, followed by outpatient services (Table 3.2).
Table 3.2
Government health expenditure by service (in drams), 2011–2015
2011 
(actual, 
dram)
2012 
(confirmed in 
budget, dram)
2013 
(planned, 
dram)
2014 
(planned, 
dram)
2015 
(planned, 
dram)
Government THE  
(excluding administration)
61 133.3 64 067.9 68 878.4 67 234.6 68 569.0
Outpatient services  
(share of public THE)
22 543.6 
(36.9%)
23 803.2 
(37.2%)
23 885.5 
(34.7%)
24 169.3 
(35.9%)
27 155.6 
(39.6%)
Inpatient services  
(share of public THE)
26 884.2 
(44.0%)
27 080.9 
(42.3%)
27 246.1 
(39.6%)
28 265.0 
(42.0%)
30 993.3 
(45.2%)
Centralized procurement of 
pharmaceuticals
3 795.4 3 687.5 3 687.5 3 687.5 3 687.5
Public health services 2 958.0 3 069.4 3 155.8 3 293.5 3 805.9
Other health-related services 
and programmes
1 250.5 1 219.1 1 222.0 1 222.5 1 362.9
World Bank loan and grant programmes 3 701.6 5 207.8 9 671.5 6 596.8 1 563.8
Capital expenditure 3 386.1 4 989.9 8 541.7 6 191.7 1 563.8
Source: Ministry of Finance, 2013.
Note: THE: Total health expenditure.
3.2 Sources of revenue and financial flows
The WHO National Health Accounts Series is a validated dataset that is 
updated annually through a collaborative process managed by WHO and 
involving substantial input from individual countries and other international 
agencies (WHO, 2013). For the purpose of international comparison, it is the 
best available data because it uses a unified methodology for all countries to 
measure health expenditure around the world. At the same time, it has been 
acknowledged that private OOP expenditure, especially informal payments, are 
likely to be underestimated (Kutzin & Jakab, 2010).
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Since independence, health care financing has been dominated by OOP 
payments, although the proportion has fallen substantially since the year 2000 
(Table 3.3). There have been substantial increases in government allocations 
to the health sector (see section 3.1) but overall, budgetary revenue in the 
system is very low (Jowett & Danielyan, 2010). Extensive coverage is provided 
through the BBP, which is available to specific segments of the population 
such as households living in poverty, pensioners and children (although the 
ages covered can vary; see section 3.3.1). The SHA is the third-party payer that 
pools and allocates public funds by contracting with health care providers for 
the delivery of the BBP (see section 3.3.3). Resources from OOP payments are 
by their nature not pooled, and they are made up of formal co-payments for 
services under the BBP, direct payments for services not covered by the BBP 
and informal payments including gratuities (see section 3.4). VHI plays a very 
minor role.
Table 3.3
Percentage of total health expenditure according to sources of revenue, 1995–2011 
(selected years)
Source of revenue 1995 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
General government 
expenditure
31.0 18.1 30.4 38.0 41.6 44.5 43.5 40.5 35.8
OOP payments 65.9 77.1 66.6 57.7 54.8 51.8 52.5 55.2 57.4
Non-profit-making institutions 
serving households
1.1 2.8 1.3 2.4 1.4 1.4 1.9 2.1 4.4
VHI 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3
Other 2.0 2.0 1.7 1.8 2.1 2.1 1.8 1.9 2.1
Source: WHO, 2013.
The role of external funding for health has fluctuated since independence, 
and one of the challenges faced by the Ministry of Health has been to coordinate 
funding flows from various donor organizations as well as flows from different 
Armenian Diaspora groups. Given these challenges, it is unlikely that the full 
impact of these flows has been captured in the data.
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3.3 Overview of the statutory financing system
3.3.1 Coverage
Coverage has three dimensions: breadth (the proportion of the population 
covered); scope (the range of benefits covered) and depth (the proportion of the 
benefit cost covered). The Armenian Constitution of 1995 guarantees universal 
entitlement to medical services which should be funded by the state, essentially 
continuing the extensive benefits afforded to citizens in the Soviet era. However, 
these guarantees proved overambitious given the severe fiscal constraints faced 
by the Armenian Government throughout the 1990s and funding of health 
services was dominated by OOP payments. From 1997, limits have been 
placed on entitlements through the introduction of the BBP, which is a publicly 
funded package that specifies a list of services that are free of charge for the 
entire population (largely primary care, sanitary-epidemiological services 
and treatment for around 200 socially significant diseases) and that stipulates 
those groups which should receive all services free of charge. The services and 
population groups covered under the BBP are reviewed annually in response to 
budgetary and political requirements by the government. Formal user charges 
were introduced in 2011 for certain services such as some emergency care 
(see section 3.4). The range of services included in the BBP has fluctuated 
year to year, causing confusion and uncertainty for both service providers and 
patients, so from 2004 the government has sought to standardize the BBP and 
its review process.
The categories of people eligible to receive all health services free of charge 
under the BBP include those with disabilities (which are categorized into 
groups I, II or III depending on severity); veterans, active servicemen and 
their families; children (under 18 years) living with disabilities, in single-parent 
households, as orphans, or in care; large families (four or more children under 
18 years of age); and households defined as living in poverty. All but those 
identified as belonging to these socially vulnerable groups must pay user fees 
for hospital services not included in the BBP, while dental care and outpatient 
pharmaceuticals are paid for directly and in full. The three dimensions of 
coverage (its scope, depth and breadth are discussed in section 7.2.1).
3.3.2 Collection
According to estimates, 35.8% of total health expenditure came from general 
government revenues in 2011 (Fig. 3.5). Armenia’s total taxation revenue in 
2008 was 23% of GDP, which is low even relative to other countries of the 
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former Soviet Union, despite rapid economic growth from 2003 (see section 1.2); 
the key issue is poor tax collection rates (IMF, 2010). Most revenues come from 
taxes on goods and services; income taxes (income, profits and capital gains 
taxes) accounted for 5% of GDP in 2008 (IMF, 2010). Armenia relies heavily 
on indirect taxes – VAT and excise duties – and these accounted for 8.9% of 
GDP or 53% of total tax revenues in 2009 (IMF, 2010). However, most VAT is 
collected at the border and a relatively small proportion collected domestically, 
highlighting the country’s large informal economy. Nevertheless, the share of 
direct taxes did increase with economic growth (from 15% in 2003 to 23% in 
2008) and even held up in 2009 at 27% of total tax revenues when the global 
economic downturn began to bite (IMF, 2010). Significant tax breaks are given 
to many large enterprises and sectors, including agriculture and the tobacco 
industry. There are no specific taxes earmarked for health. The overall tax 
burden is low, but tax administration is weak and tax evasion through the 
underdeclaration of wages is rife. As of 1 January 2013, income tax and social 
taxes have been replaced by a single income tax that ranges from 24.4% to 
36.0%. Increasing taxation revenues by strengthening the tax system has 
become a key priority for the Armenian Government.
Fig. 3.5
Percentage of total health expenditure according to sources of revenue, 2011 
Source: WHO, 2013.
4.4%  Non-profit-making institutions serving households
0.3%  VHI
2.1%  Other
57.4%  OOP payments
35.8%  General government expenditure
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3.3.3 Pooling of funds
Pooling of funds refers to the accumulation of prepaid health care resources in 
order to cover financial risks of a population or populations. Overly fragmented 
pooling arrangements can be a significant source of inefficiency in a health 
system (Kutzin, 2001). The SHA is the dedicated single pooling and purchasing 
agency in Armenia, and budgetary resources are “centralized” in that they all 
flow from the national budget to the SHA (via the Ministry of Health) rather than 
through regional government (Fig. 3.6). However, the SHA manages general 
budget revenues only; formal co-payments paid for secondary and tertiary care 
services are retained by the facilities and direct formal and informal payments 
to staff and facilities are by definition not pooled.
The process of annual budget setting follows a typical annual cycle with 
the budget for the following fiscal year usually drafted by July by the Ministry 
of Health, reviewed by and agreed with the Ministry of Finance and then 
submitted to parliament for adoption. Since 2004, macroeconomic and fiscal 
policy is formulated and implemented according to a Medium-term Expenditure 
Framework, which follows key strategic government priorities for spending the 
limited fiscal resources available. The key priorities for health in the Medium-
term Expenditure Framework 2011–2013 were the development of primary care, 
sanitary-epidemiological security of the population, mother and child health, 
the prevention of diseases of special importance (e.g. diabetes), medical care for 
vulnerable groups and prevention of infectious diseases including HIV / AIDS 
(Government of Armenia, 2010). Local governments are by law allowed to 
allocate funds to health programmes, but this is not common practice.
3.3.4 Purchasing and purchaser–provider relations
The SHA contracts with providers for the delivery of publicly financed 
health services. Health care facilities then receive public funding based on 
a regular reporting mechanism on the provision of services under the BBP. 
This is regulated by the Ministry of Health through a system of global 
budgeting, administered by the SHA. Although it is not formally obliged to, 
the SHA contracts with every licensed health facility and contracts have never 
been terminated, so it cannot perform selective purchasing and there is no 
competition between providers for contracts. Payment rates are agreed by the 
Ministry of Finance and the SHA but do not always reflect full costs; however, 
facilities rely on public funding so are in too weak a position to negotiate higher 
reimbursement rates. The SHA now has the ability to reallocate funds between 
programmes in order to ensure the whole of the health budget is spent – although 
all changes need to be agreed by the Ministry of Finance and the government.
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Fig. 3.6
Financial flows 
Source: Author’s own compilation.
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3.4 OOP payments
OOP payments constitute the main source of funding for the health sector in 
Armenia, accounting for 57.4% of total health expenditure in 2011 (see Fig. 3.5 
and section 3.2). OOP payments consist of formal co-payments (user fees), 
direct payments for services not covered under the BBP and informal payments 
to facilities and individual staff members. The proportion of OOP payments 
in total health expenditure peaked in 2000 at just over 75%; so although still 
high, the current level actually represents some improvement, even though 
levels have been steadily increasing since 2008 (Table 3.3). It has not been easy 
to generate sufficient revenues for prepayment through the national budget 
because of weaknesses in the taxation system (see section 3.3.2). Through the 
1990s, this meant the gap between what was nominally covered by the state and 
what was actually funded by the state widened and largely informal payments 
expanded to fill the gap. The introduction of the BBP in 1997 and its subsequent 
refining have served to “formalize” at least some of these payments by defining 
the package of benefits to be funded by the state more tightly. However, the 
chronic underfunding of health providers means that the direct funding of the 
health system remains one of the most acute problems the health system faces. 
The size of the informal economy in Armenia and the prevalence of informal 
payments in the health system are also the key barriers to generating sufficient 
funds for prepayment of services.
The very nature of informal payments means that estimating their relative 
contribution to OOP payments is challenging. It has been estimated that 45% 
of total health expenditure is in the form of informal payments (Torosyan et al., 
2008). A survey conducted in 2011 found that 63% of all payments made for 
surgery were unofficial (Akkazieva & Jowett, 2013). Most OOP expenditure 
is for inpatient services and pharmaceuticals rather than primary care, which 
is consistent with the government focus on universal access to primary care. 
However, the implications for equity of such high OOP expenditure are serious, 
and reducing the risk of catastrophic health care costs has been a key aim in 
health financing policy (see section 7.2).
3.4.1 Cost-sharing (user charges)
Official user charges were introduced in 1997 alongside the BBP and aimed 
to legitimize informal payments for services. It has been estimated through 
survey data that around 80% of OOP spending is informal (Torosyan et al., 
2008), but it is often hard for patients to distinguish formal and informal user 
charges. In 2003, the Ministry of Health introduced formal cost-sharing through 
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co-payments under the BBP for Yerevan hospitals. A flat rate fee of US$ 18 was 
charged to patients not considered socially vulnerable for specified inpatient 
treatments.
The measure aimed to assess the potential of formal co-payments as a means 
to increase revenue for health care facilities as well as to reduce the level of 
informal payments. However, neither was achieved. The newly introduced 
co-payments did not enable health facilities to generate sufficient additional 
revenue to cover their costs, and the level of informal payments was not 
noticeably reduced. The flat-rate co-payment system was therefore abandoned. 
However, at the behest of the Ministry of Finance, more co-payments were 
introduced for a range of services nominally covered under the statutory 
benefits package, including emergency care (except for emergency resuscitation 
services) and gynaecological services in February 2011 and for oncological 
services and treatment for sexually transmitted diseases in October 2012. A 
recent study found that, following the introduction of formal charges in 2011, 
the incidence of OOP payments overall (both official and unofficial) fell by 
5.8% (Akkazieva & Jowett, 2013).
3.4.2 Direct payments
Direct payments are most often levied for dental care, ophthalmic care, inpatient 
and outpatient treatments not covered under the BBP and, most significantly, 
outpatient pharmaceuticals (see section 2.8.4). The level of user charges outside 
the BBP is not regulated. 
3.4.3 Informal payments
Informal payments existed in the Soviet Union largely in the form of gratuities 
as a means of acknowledging the low wages paid to medical staff. Informal 
payments in independent Armenia have now evolved into an almost formalized 
system of fees, including barter goods and services in rural areas, for health 
care providers, auxiliary personnel and administrators (Hakobyan et al., 2006). 
Accurate estimates of the size of informal payments patients are being charged 
when consulting a health professional are difficult to provide, particularly as 
it is necessary to distinguish between the formal co-payments for services 
and the additional payment and also because the amount will vary depending 
on the service sought, the health professional, the patient and the location 
(urban/rural). Limited available evidence suggests that the highest informal 
payments are requested for obstetrics/gynaecological services, followed by 
surgery and any “life-or-death” procedure (Hakobyan et al., 2006). Findings 
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from a 2004 qualitative study provided estimates of US$ 45 being charged for 
a hospital admission, and up to US$ 200 for a caesarean section, which was 
2.5 times the average monthly salary (Poletti et al., 2007). However, an analysis 
of the Obstetric Care State Certificate (OCSC) Programme found that this 
intervention not only increased utilization of antenatal care services but also 
significantly reduced informal payments for obstetric care (Truzyan, Grigoryan 
& Krajewski-Siuda, 2010). Under the OCSC, 34.2% of women still paid out 
of pocket for obstetric care (on average around US$ 100), but this represents 
a substantial improvement (Crape et al., 2011). In their study, Akkazieva and 
Jowett (2013) found that there was an 8.2% reduction in the number of patients 
making unofficial payments in hospitals following the introduction of official 
charges, although the average amount increased significantly among those who 
did pay.
3.5 VHI
Private VHI does not play a significant role in the Armenian health system 
at present (it accounted for 0.3% of total health expenditure in 2011) although 
its legal status was set in 2004 with the Law on Insurance in Armenia. The 
emerging private health insurance industry faces numerous challenges, not 
only around the lack of awareness of insurance schemes in general but also 
in the scale of informal payments in the health system, which are hard to 
cover under a complementary or supplementary insurance scheme. Access 
to services of perceived higher quality is also easily achieved through OOP 
payments so the potential supplementary role for private insurance is weaker. 
However, expansion of private health insurance is most restricted by the cost 
of commercial insurance premiums, which are unaffordable for most citizens. 
Most private schemes are limited to the staff of international organizations 
and companies, and this cover does not always provide adequate protection 
from informal payments. A new scheme offering cover to certain state-sector 
employees was introduced in 2012, but it is too early to assess the impact of 
this programme (see section 6.1).
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3.6 Other financing
3.6.1 Parallel health systems
There are some parallel health systems still operating in Armenia under the 
Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and others. The health 
and preventive services are provided directly to employees and services but 
are sometimes open to the general public. Funding comes directly from the 
budgets of the ministries concerned rather than through the Ministry of Health, 
but it is not as significant a feature of the system as it is elsewhere in the former 
Soviet Union.
3.6.2 External sources of funds
External sources of funds are primarily loans and grant projects coordinated 
by the Ministry of Health. These projects are financed by foreign governments, 
multilateral organizations such as United Nations agencies, the EU and the 
World Bank and international NGOs such as Oxfam, Save the Children and 
World Vision. National Health Accounts estimates suggest that in 2011 external 
sources of funds accounted for 5.9% of total health expenditure, down from 
a peak of 17.3% in 2007 (WHO, 2013). In these estimates, external sources of 
funds are most often considered public funds or general government revenues 
for health expenditure but funds from international NGOs or Diaspora (see 
below) would be included under private expenditure.
3.6.3 Other sources of financing
The Armenian Diaspora remains a significant contributor of humanitarian aid 
for health, which is often informal in nature, building on personal links where 
medical supplies and equipment are donated directly to facilities, providers 
and households without the direct involvement or knowledge of the Ministry of 
Health. By their very nature, these resources are hard to track and measure and 
the Ministry of Health generally only manages to record the larger donations; 
however, the Armenian Medical International Committee (2013) has developed 
a database to assist the Ministry of Health in tracking Diaspora projects. 
However, as with external sources of funds, the global economic downturn 
since 2009 has had a marked impact on the flow of funds from Diaspora 
communities.
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3.7 Payment mechanisms
3.7.1 Paying for health services
The SHA is the main purchaser of health services in Armenia through contracts 
with 80% of all health facilities. Funding for the SHAEI services come direct 
from the Ministry of Health budget and is based on historical expenditure 
patterns, although this may change following planned reorganization of the 
service (see section 5.1). Primary care services under the BBP are purchased 
by the SHA according to a simple capitation formula that is weighted for age: 
one capitation payment is made for adults over 18 years (1441 dram per person 
per year in 2009) and payments are doubled for patients aged 17 years and 
under (2882 dram per person per year in 2009). Capitation payments used to 
be made for a population in a given catchment area; they are now paid based 
on the number of patients enrolled. There is no differentiation by gender and 
historical spending is not a factor. Capitation rates are adjusted according to 
the resources available in the health budget, which has been squeezed since 
the global economic downturn began in 2008, but they do not reflect the full 
cost of services provided, which is a contributing factor in the persistence of 
informal payments. Rural primary care providers are allocated extra funds (an 
extra 7% for mountainous and 14% for extremely mountainous areas), but urban 
providers that offer additional services such as narrow specialists receive much 
more funding (Yoder & Johansen, 2010). Also, there has been a problem with 
allocated or even disbursed funds for feldsher/midwife health posts (FAPs) 
not actually reaching their destination in the remote rural areas as they are 
swallowed up en route (Poletti et al., 2007).
A more subtle approach to capitation that is ‘budget-neutral’ but which 
better reflects the higher cost of very young children and older adults, and also 
women of reproductive age, has been developed by the SHA with support from 
the United States Agency for International Development (Yoder & Johansen, 
2010). The new capitation mechanisms were piloted in 2011 and were used in 
conjunction with bonus payments to family doctors (see section 3.7.2). The net 
income of primary care facilities should not increase or decrease drastically, 
but the funding mechanisms should better reflect the needs of the population 
served and remove incentives to avoid taking on older patients who cost more 
to treat (see also section 5.3).
Although primary care services are covered under the BBP for the whole 
population, hospital and specialist outpatient services are only covered for 
vulnerable groups and for certain diagnoses. Consequently, most specialist 
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outpatient and hospital care is paid on a fee-for-service basis by patients and 
their households. Often this involves the payment of a lump sum “up front” 
on admission to cover all the projected costs of inpatient care (Akkazieva & 
Jowett, 2013) Formal co-payments for hospital services and emergency care 
(excluding resuscitation) provided under the BBP were introduced in 2011 for 
all but certain vulnerable groups. For services under the BBP, hospital and 
specialist outpatient services are funded through global budgets as part of a 
prospective payment system based on an agreed number of hospital cases. The 
global budget is set as a ceiling defined by the availability of funds, historical 
expenditure and the number of cases. Hospital cases are differentiated according 
to clinical specialty or condition, type of care required (i.e. inpatient /outpatient, 
average length of stay, etc.). Where a hospital is “underspending”, the SHA has 
the ability to appeal the budget and reallocate the funds to ensure the whole of 
the health budget is spent (see section 3.3.4). Hospitals are reimbursed monthly 
per eligible discharged patient or per outpatient visit. The SHA sets hospital 
rates for each diagnosis or disease group as defined in the relevant hospital 
care subprogrammes of the BBP. Rates are refined on an annual basis but are 
based on the obligated budget rather than actual production costs. The rates are 
meant to cover both fixed and variable costs and to reflect relative differences 
in case-specific length of hospitals stay and clinical complexity.
The absolute majority of pharmaceuticals are purchased by patients through 
OOP payments (see section 5.6). Facilities receive a global budget for essential 
drugs and diagnostic tests. Prices for these items are fixed by the Ministry of 
Health and a limited range of drugs are available to all patients with a broader 
package available to vulnerable groups and people with certain diagnoses. 
Expenditure on different vulnerable groups is fixed and resources cannot be 
redistributed from one group to another to cover any shortfall. This means, 
for example, that essential drugs for older people with long-term conditions 
are chronically underfunded as the finance allocated is half that allocated to 
children but the need is much greater (Yoder & Johansen, 2010). It is common, 
therefore, for patients who are entitled to free drugs to have to purchase them 
out of pocket because the primary care facility has already exhausted the 
global budget.
3.7.2 Paying health workers
It is generally recognized that salaries of health care workers in Armenia have 
been low and the gap between what they receive and what could be considered 
a living wage is most often filled by informal payments. Wage arrears 
were common and wages were low until 2003–2004 when the government 
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substantially increased the budget allocated to the health sector; this resulted in 
the regular transfer of funds to health facilities so wages could be paid on time. 
The level of informal payments for different categories of health workers varies. 
For example, those working in psychiatry or tuberculosis care are not well 
placed to elicit informal payments whereas gynaecology and cardiology have 
the potential to be much more profitable branches of medicine. In order to try 
and reduce the level of informal payments to medical staff, more resources were 
allocated in 2010 specifically to cover the cost of wage increases for doctors 
primarily but potentially also for other health workers. The aim was for the 
average doctor’s salary to rise to US$ 1000 per month, but these extra funds 
did not materialize (Harutyunyan, 2010).
Salaries for health care workers in primary care are the most strictly 
regulated; for all other health care workers, as less of their work is funded 
under the BBP, there is overall less regulation of salary levels and remuneration 
mechanisms. However, all facilities must remunerate staff at above the minimum 
wage level, which was set at 32 500 dram (US$ 88) per month from 1 January 
2010. For those in primary care, salaries are based on capitation payments for 
the number of patients enrolled at their facility. In order to encourage doctors 
to retrain, family doctors have been paid more since 2005. Family doctors in 
pilot regions are also able to supplement their capitation-based salaries with 
bonus payments, which are designed to provide incentives for family doctors 
to handle, for example, the day-to-day care of patients with chronic conditions 
rather than referring the patient to specialist care providers. Nevertheless, it 
has been calculated that doctors working in primary care and relying solely on 
their salary after taxes would be living very close to the poverty line or even 
below it depending on how many dependants there were in their households 
(EDRC, 2011).
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4. Physical and human resources
At independence, Armenia inherited an oversized health care system with a major focus on specialized care. Since then, there has been a rapid contraction in the number of acute care hospital beds as financing 
incentives shifted from input to output measures and some reduction in the 
overall number of hospitals; this was largely achieved through the closure of 
many rural hospitals, which were re-designated as primary care facilities. In 
2011, there were 130 hospitals in Armenia, many of them in the capital city 
Yerevan. The number of primary care facilities also fell following independence, 
from 1686 in 1991 to 997 in 2004, largely through the closure of FAPs in remote 
rural areas. However, the emphasis on developing primary care has reversed 
this trend somewhat and in 2009 there were 1056 primary care units nationwide.
Since 1991, the overall Armenian health workforce has contracted. The 
number of specialist doctors and dentists has increased, but the number of 
mid-level personnel per capita and in real terms has fallen precipitously. 
However, while the supply of physicians in the health system has remained 
relatively stable in per capita terms, the balance of specialists has not shifted 
away from hospital services and there is a shortage of doctors serving rural areas 
while there is a surplus in Yerevan. Although they are not recognized within 
the EU, Armenian medical qualifications are recognized across the former 
Soviet Union, and formal salaries for nurses and doctors are considerably higher 
outside the country; this has led to high levels of outmigration of health workers.
4.1 Physical resources
4.1.1 Capital stock and investments
Similar to other countries in the region, Armenia inherited an oversized health 
care system with a major focus on specialized care, with a total of 183 hospitals 
in 1991 for a population of approximately 3.6 million. The number of hospitals 
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reduced sharply between 1999 and 2000 (from 174 to 146) with the closure of 
many rural facilities, which were re-designated as primary care facilities. In 
2011, there were 130 hospitals in Armenia, most being in Yerevan. The number 
of primary care units was 1686 in 1991, and this fell to 997 in 2004 through the 
closure of many FAPs in remote rural areas, many of which lacked the most 
basic facilities. However, the emphasis on developing primary care has reversed 
this trend somewhat and in 2009 there were 1056 primary care units nationwide 
(WHO Regional Office for Europe, 2013).
There is no single source of information describing the age or condition of 
hospitals in Armenia. However, in general multiprofile hospitals were built in 
the 1960s and 1970s and have subsequently been remodelled and renovated 
several times depending on the availability of funds from the state (prior to 
1990) or from donors/investments by the owners (after 1990). The bed capacity 
varies from 200 to 500 and the number of staff varies from around 300 to 
1500. The size has been influenced by the implementation of the Hospital 
Optimization Programme as some larger hospitals incorporate both maternity 
services and polyclinics too. In recent years, many new hospitals have been 
built in the regions, mainly with World Bank support.
Overall, hospital optimization in the regions has proved successful. There 
has been a significant reduction in excess infrastructure and human resources, 
consolidation of services and substantial efficiency and productivity gains 
(see section 4.1.2). However, hospital optimization was most successful in 
those regions where it was followed by substantial investments in the hospital 
network. In Yerevan the consolidation of services has been hampered by the 
hospital privatization programme (see section 2.4).
4.1.2 Infrastructure
The total number of hospital beds per capita in Armenia has fallen dramatically 
since independence, from 909 hospital beds per 100 000 population in 1990 
to 395 in 2011. This is extremely low for countries of the former Soviet Union 
as an extensive infrastructure was one notable feature of the Semashko 
health system (Fig. 4.1). However, the overall downward trend has not been 
the same across different categories of hospital bed; the number of acute care 
hospital beds has fallen continuously, but the number of psychiatric hospital 
beds has remained reasonably stable since 2005 and the number of long 
term care beds has been increasing (Fig. 4.2). The reduction in bed numbers 
was encouraged by changed purchasing mechanisms, which were oriented 
towards outputs (such as the number of patients treated) rather than inputs
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Fig. 4.1
Acute care hospital beds per 100 000 population in Armenia and selected countries, 
1990 to latest available year 
Source: WHO Regional Office for Europe, 2013.
Fig. 4.2
Mix of beds per 100 000 population in acute hospitals, psychiatric hospitals and 
long-term care institutions, 1990–2011 
Source: WHO Regional Office for Europe, 2013.
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Fig. 4.3a
Operating indicators for acute care hospitals in Armenia and selected countries, 
1990 to latest available year: Bed occupancy rate 
Source: WHO Regional Office for Europe, 2013.
Fig. 4.3b
Operating indicators for acute care hospitals in Armenia and selected countries, 
1990 to latest available year: Average length of stay 
Source: WHO Regional Office for Europe, 2013.
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(such as the number of beds). Nevertheless, despite the contraction in bed 
numbers, occupancy rates for acute care beds fell from 65.5% in 1990 to just 
28.2% in 2000; although the number of acute care beds has continued to fall, 
occupancy rates have improved, reaching 57.3% in 2010 (Fig. 4.3a). As the 
average length of stay in acute care hospitals has halved since 1994, it is likely 
that the improvements in operating indicators reflect greater efficiency in 
hospital care (Fig. 4.3b), but it is possible that the improved occupancy rate 
reflects some improvements in access to care (see section 7.3.2).
4.1.3 Medical equipment
Although increasing provider autonomy has permitted health care facilities 
to procure equipment independently, the Ministry of Health has retained 
the right to license the use of all high-technology equipment with a view to 
maintaining standards. High technologies (such as magnetic resonance imaging 
and computed tomography scanners) are available mostly in Yerevan, although 
some regions also have such equipment. As the big hospitals are mostly 
privatized, the equipment has been bought by the hospital owners using their 
own funds or, in some cases, equipment or funding for such equipment was 
provided by donors.
4.1.4 Information technology
The current use of information technology in the health system is mostly 
limited to vertical programmes and there is little coordination of information 
technology systems in the health sector. Computers are not an integrated part 
of primary care and while there is a system in place, electronic medical records 
and electronic booking systems are not widely used. In order to establish a 
universal electronic data management system, the Ministry of Health is 
implementing e-health reforms as part of the overall e-governance programme 
(see section 2.7). There are no available data on patients accessing the Internet 
for health information, but overall access to the Internet is low by European 
standards: only 32% of Armenians were Internet users in 2011 (World Bank, 
2013).
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4.2 Human resources
4.2.1 Health workforce trends
Since 1991, the overall Armenian health workforce has contracted. The number 
of specialist doctors and dentists has increased, but the number of mid-level 
personnel per capita and in real terms has fallen precipitously (Table 4.1). 
The falling number of general medical practitioners may be connected to the 
programme of retraining generalists working in primary care as family doctors 
(see section 5.3). In the longer term, the aim is for narrow specialists working 
at the primary care level to be moved to hospitals while family doctors take 
over many of their roles.
Table 4.1
Health workers in Armenia (physical persons) per 100 000 population, 2000–2011 
(selected years)
2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Physicians (total) 278.0 258.1 257.4 261.1 264.4 263.7 268.7 284.6
Specialist physicians 59.2 61.2 61.1 62.8 65.3 65.4 67.1 71.9
Surgeons 48.0 46.9 48.0 48.8 49.5 50.3 51.8 54.7
Obstetrician/gynaecologists 21.3 20.6 21.0 21.5 22.0 22.5 23.2 24.9
Paediatricians 43.1 34.9 33.1 31.2 30.0 27.2 25.9 26.0
General practitioners 45.7 41.7 41.9 45.0 46.2 47.9 48.5 51.0
Dentists 23.0 29.8 29.3 31.3 37.0 38.4 38.6 41.9
Pharmacists 3.3 3.0 3.2 3.4 3.3 3.4 3.8 3.9
Nurses 562.1 462.2 468.2 467.4 467.3 461.2 463.0 491.9
Source: WHO Regional Office for Europe, 2013.
However, the breakdown of specialties shown in Table 4.1 reveal that 
although the supply of physicians in the health system has remained relatively 
stable in per capita terms, as they have in many other countries of the former 
Soviet Union (Fig. 4.4), the balance of specialists has not shifted away from 
hospital services, as demonstrated by the consistent rise in the number of 
surgeons per capita. The geographical distribution of health care workers is 
also challenging as most doctors work in Yerevan, while there is a shortage of 
doctors willing to work in rural areas.
The shortage of nurses in the health workforce has continued in Armenia, 
and although the situation is not as severe as in neighbouring Georgia, it is 
still well below the average number of nurses per capita in the CIS or the EU 
(Fig. 4.5). Again, while it is not as severe as in neighbouring Georgia, the nurse-
to-doctor ratio does limit the capacity for the Ministry of Health to broaden the 
role of nurses in the system relative to doctors (Fig. 4.6).
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Fig. 4.4
Number of physicians per 100 000 population in Armenia and selected other countries, 
1990 to latest available year 
Source: WHO Regional Office for Europe, 2013.
Fig. 4.5
Number of nurses per 100 000 population in Armenia and selected other countries, 
1990 to latest available year 
Source: WHO Regional Office for Europe, 2013.
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Fig. 4.6
Number of physicians and nurses per 100 000 population in the WHO European 
Region, latest available year 
Sources: WHO Regional Office for Europe, 2013; * European Commission, 2013 (data for nurses in Sweden).
Notes: Where two different years are mentioned, the first one indicates the number of physicians and the second one indicates the 
number of nurses (PP); PP: Physical persons.
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Although the official data supplied to the Health for All database do indicate 
that the supply of pharmacists in the Armenian health system is extremely low 
and well below the average for countries of the EU or CIS (Fig. 4.7), this is 
because pharmacists working in the private sector (where most pharmaceutical 
services are provided) are not necessarily covered by the national data. 
Although pharmacies all need to be licensed (see section 2.8.4), pharmacists 
do not have to be registered or licensed (Ministry of Health of the Republic of 
Armenia, 2010).
Fig. 4.7
Number of pharmacists per 100 000 population in Armenia and selected 
other countries, 1990 to latest available year 
Source: WHO Regional Office for Europe, 2013.
4.2.2 Professional mobility of health workers
The high levels of outmigration in Armenia also apply to health workers. 
Armenian qualifications are recognized across the former Soviet Union and 
formal salaries for nurses and doctors are considerably higher outside the 
country (see section 3.7.2). Recruitment of health workers from abroad is not a 
significant feature of the system. The issues of “brain drain” and “brain waste” 
are, however, significant for the country, but clear policies to mitigate the effects 
of this have not yet been formulated.
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4.2.3 Training of health workers
In 2011, there were six private and one state institution providing undergraduate 
medical training. From September 2006, medical education at the Yerevan State 
Medical University has been arranged to reflect the Bologna process, with the 
undergraduate medical training level taking five years, followed by two years 
of specialization (formally at Master’s level) after which doctors receive their 
diplomas and can go and work in primary care or enter residency training, 
the length of which depends on the specialty chosen. Armenian medical 
qualifications are recognized in Nepal, Sri Lanka and India but in the EU or 
the United States graduates are required to take further examinations in order to 
practise medicine. From 2012, entry examinations for the Yerevan State Medical 
University were reintroduced. The appropriateness of the Bologna process for 
medical education has been questioned and medical education is likely to be 
reorganized as a one-step undergraduate programme once more. The Ministry 
of Education is responsible for setting educational standards for undergraduate 
training of health care personnel, but the curriculum is developed in close 
cooperation with the Ministry of Health.
After undergraduate training, doctors then need to complete their specialist 
training in order to practise independently. Training requires 2 to 10 years 
depending on specialization and is provided by specialized clinical centres 
and the university hospital (which is attached to the Yerevan State Medical 
University) that are specifically accredited to provide such training. In theory, 
the specialist training centres could be in either the private or public sector, but 
in practice they are almost all attached to publicly owned facilities. There is no 
limit on the number of students recruited to different specializations provided 
they have passed the entry test. Training for doctors and nurses, including 
refresher training, is provided chiefly by the National Institute of Health, with 
a small part of the training occurring at the Yerevan State Medical University 
on a paid basis. Training may be paid for by the government, a health care 
facility or personal funds. Since the National Institute of Health appears to have 
sufficient capacity to train the required number of doctors and nurses, the gap 
in training may be because of lack of funds. Existing regulations require that 
Armenian doctors and nurses take continuous education courses every five 
years. As of 2006, this standard had been met by 56.7% of the medical doctors 
and 32.5% of the nurses. Estimates for 2008 showed an improvement for these 
indicators, with the percentage of doctors and nurses receiving such training 
within the previous five years being 62.6% and 40.0%, respectively.
Health systems in transition  Armenia 59
Historically, generalists (i.e. those doctors who finished medical school 
but who did not enter specialist training) worked in primary care, but “family 
medicine” is not considered a specialization, and many generalists have now 
trained as family doctors. Linked to this, paediatrics is now recognized as 
a postgraduate specialty and the undergraduate paediatrics stream has been 
discontinued. The training and retraining programme for family medicine 
is now considered to be in line with international standards. Continuous 
professional development and mandatory relicensing procedures are detailed 
in section 2.8.3.
Nurses, midwives dental nurses and physiotherapists are trained at one of 
seven state nursing colleges or 10 private nursing colleges and their education 
lasts for three or four years. The specialist training of nurses for different 
disciplines is not well developed and generally consists of short courses and 
projects delivered as part of development assistance work through international 
partners, such as projects to consolidate family medicine for primary care 
providers. The scope of practice for nurses remains relatively narrow and the 
low status of nursing as a career is reflected in the low number of nurses relative 
to doctors per capita (see Fig. 4.6).
4.2.4 Doctors’ career paths
Once doctors have completed their undergraduate and specialist training, they 
are expected to undertake continuous professional development in order to work 
their way up through the professional categories (higher, first and second – as 
in the Soviet era) and thereby gain grounds for promotion. Recruitment and 
promotion decisions are taken locally within the hospital, and promotion is 
largely at the discretion of hospital management. Overall, in practice, there is a 
certain lack of transparency around both recruitment and promotion procedures 
in the health sector.
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5. Provision of services
The public health system in Armenia is focused primarily on the control of communicable disease, although noncommunicable disease control and monitoring is increasingly being integrated into public health services. 
Environmental and communicable disease control functions, among others, are 
the responsibility of the SHAEI as are the mechanisms for the notification 
and surveillance of disease outbreaks. The majority of preventive services 
(including immunization) and health promotion activities are integrated with 
primary care services. The Ministry of Health recommends that Armenian 
citizens undergo a preventive health examination at least once a year, and 19% 
of men and 25% of women do. Health promotion around lifestyle issues such as 
tobacco and alcohol consumption is piecemeal, but since reorganization in 2012, 
the SHAEI is also responsible for the control of noncommunicable diseases.
Utilization of primary care services in Armenia has declined more than for 
hospital care, and outpatient contacts per person per year are among the lowest 
in the WHO European Region. Central to reforms in primary care in Armenia 
has been the introduction of family medicine as the integrative, “first point of 
contact” organizational principle for the delivery of care and the main direction 
for improving accessibility of care, but implementation has been, and continues 
to be, difficult, particularly in urban areas where the old polyclinic system 
prevails. The traditional focus on specialist care has posed a particular challenge 
and the prevalence of OOP payments in the system hampers gatekeeping at the 
primary care level.
Hospitals in Armenia enjoy a high level of autonomy with regard to 
determining objectives and specific functions, strategic management, 
administration, financial management, as well as human resource management. 
Efforts to optimize the hospital network have only had a limited impact on 
efficiency, quality of care and public accountability thus far.
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Palliative, long-term and rehabilitation care are not well developed as 
parts of the health system that affect the system’s overall efficiency. Most 
long-term care is provided in the family and there are few resources available 
for informal carers.
There are 17 licensed pharmaceutical manufacturers in Armenia all of 
which specialize in manufacturing generics, and all are working towards GMP 
compliance. Community pharmacies are predominantly private, profit-making 
enterprises. Geographical access to pharmacies in Yerevan and other urban 
areas is good, but it can be problematic in rural areas. Very few outpatient 
pharmaceuticals are provided through the BBP and pharmaceuticals are a major 
household expenditure in Armenia.
5.1 Public health
Environmental and communicable disease control functions are the responsibility 
of the SHAEI as are the mechanisms for the notification and surveillance of 
disease outbreaks. Following extensive reorganization in 2012, their functions 
have been broadened to include noncommunicable disease control. The SHAEI 
consists of a headquarters office and seven operations offices in Yerevan as 
well as 10 regional offices and several additional facilities. There are also 14 
non-profit-making “testing centres”, which were established in 2002 to provide 
the necessary laboratory testing services. The SHAEI is under the Ministry of 
Health and has a range of responsibilities including:
• ensuring the sanitary-epidemiological safety of the population;
• inspecting and monitoring legal and physical entities with regard to the 
requirements of sanitary laws and by-laws;
• protecting the public’s health and coordinating prevention activities 
for communicable and noncommunicable diseases;
• ensuring healthy living conditions;
• transfer of knowledge and educating the public;
• identifying and preventing hazards affecting population safety; and 
• notification of especially dangerous diseases.
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All physicians are required to notify local SHAEI offices about all instances 
of diagnosed communicable disease. This is expected to facilitate timely 
data collection, analysis and assessment in support of disease control and 
outbreak response.
The majority of preventive services (including immunization) and health 
promotion activities are integrated with primary care services, although 
they are coordinated by the Department of Public Health in the Ministry of 
Health. The Ministry of Health recommends that Armenian citizens undergo 
a preventive health examination at least once a year. Currently, a preventive 
health examination includes a routine check-up to detect high blood pressure, 
diabetes and lung diseases, plus a breast examination and the Pap smear test 
for women and a prostate gland examination for men (Armstat et al., 2012). The 
Demographic and Health Survey in 2010 found that 25% of women and 19% of 
men in Armenia had visited a health facility for a routine checkup in the three 
years preceding the survey (Armstat et al., 2012).
Health education
The Ministry of Health has launched a series of national awareness and 
information campaigns on specific health problems such as tobacco, alcohol and 
HIV / AIDS. It has also come to an agreement with the Ministry of Education 
to introduce health education programmes into the school curriculum. The 
Ministry of Health is, however, no longer the only agency active in health 
education: other ministries and organizations are now publishing materials and 
promoting behaviour change, such as the Ministry of Education, departments 
of health and social security at municipal and regional levels, NGOs and others. 
Public and private mass media also prepare, publish and broadcast reports, 
interviews and round-table discussions on healthy lifestyle issues such as 
smoke-free workplaces, personal behaviour, diet and nutritional habits. The 
Demographic and Health Survey 2010 found that more than 80% of women 
and more than 50% of men have seen or heard a health message on the radio 
or television or in a newspaper or magazine in the few months preceding the 
survey, with exposure to television messages being by far the most common 
(Armstat et al., 2012). Nevertheless, respondents residing in rural areas, those 
with lower levels of education and those living in poorer households were less 
likely to have seen or heard health messages through any media source than 
respondents from urban areas, those with higher levels of education and those 
living in more economically advantaged households (Armstat et al., 2012). The 
potential for social marketing is, therefore, great but more needs to be done to 
meet the needs of rural populations and the most vulnerable.
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5.2 Patient pathways
Box 5.1 illustrates a pathway in Armenia that a woman in need of a hip 
replacement because of arthritis would take.
Box 5.1
A typical patient pathway in Armenia
A woman in need of a hip replacement because of arthritis would take the following pathway 
through the health care system.
•   During a free visit to the district physician or family doctor with whom she is registered, 
she is referred either for an additional consultation with a specialist in the polyclinic where 
there is one or direct to a hospital orthopaedics department. These steps do not involve 
significant charges or fees.
•   The patient has access to any public or private secondary or tertiary care hospital and the 
doctors at the primary care level advise her on which hospital to select based on where the 
patient lives, any special needs she may have and the expected quality of specialist care 
within the chosen hospital, etc.
•   Referral does not usually involve any waiting time as inpatient utilization rates are so low; 
in many cases, patients bypass referral through the primary care level altogether and simply 
self-refer to hospital.
•   If she chooses to go to a public hospital she must pay formal charges ex ante which apply 
to selected services including an admission fee and "hotel" charges; also she or her family 
will have to make additional informal payments to the surgeon as well as other personnel 
(e.g. the anaesthetist, nurses, auxiliary staff, etc.). Formal user charges will be waived if 
she is considered a member of a vulnerable group, as the surgery will be covered under 
the BBP; however, she may still have to make informal payments.
•   If the patient opts for a private hospital she has to cover all the costs of surgery and 
associated care to be paid in full out of pocket.
•   Surgery will be scheduled soon after a detailed assessment of the patient; this usually 
involves repeating many diagnostic tests and procedures as hospital specialists have little 
confidence in the quality of diagnostics undertaken at the primary care level.
•   Following surgery and a recovery period at the hospital, which does not generally involve 
a discharge plan, the patient goes home where she will need additional home care. This is 
provided by her family or a visiting nurse from the local polyclinic; the latter is typically 
not part of a systematic after-care plan but considered as a personal courtesy or paid visits 
(charged informally).
•   In most cases, the patient will pass on the discharge summary to her primary care doctor. 
There is no formal responsibility for follow-up either through the district physician or 
the specialist who performed the surgery; any follow-up will be negotiated between the 
patient and her service provider.
•   For specialist follow-up and any rehabilitation services, the patient will be referred to 
an orthopaedic specialist at a specialized orthopaedics facility.
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5.3 Primary/ambulatory care 
Primary care is typically provided by a network of first-contact outpatient 
facilities involving urban polyclinics, health centres, rural ambulatory facilities 
and FAPs, depending on the size of the population in a particular community. 
According to government norms, a physician at the primary care level serves a 
population of 1200–2000 adults and a paediatrician typically covers 700–800 
children. In 2010, there were over 504 ambulatory facilities and polyclinics in 
the country (Armstat, 2011b). FAPs are located in small villages and are run 
by nurses, midwives, and/or feldshers, who are supervised by physicians from 
nearby polyclinics and ambulatory facilities. Officially, the role of FAP staff has 
been limited to very basic interventions, and in order to access higher levels of 
the health care system, people in rural areas have to travel to population centres 
with a population of more than 2000, which are served by ambulatory facilities 
and polyclinics staffed by physicians, nurses and midwives (Poletti et al., 2007). 
Yet, FAP staff have been forced by circumstances to deliver services for which 
they are not appropriately trained. Rural health posts have deteriorated since 
independence, but they still fulfil an important advisory, triage and referral 
function (Poletti et al., 2007).
The decentralization process of the mid-1990s led to a functional 
disintegration of the primary health care system and created considerable 
inequity in access to services between urban and rural areas, which remains. 
Utilization of primary care services in Armenia has declined more than for 
hospital care, and outpatient contacts per person per year are among the lowest 
in the WHO European Region (Fig. 5.1). The continued low level of utilization 
may be explained by a combination of factors; for example, many patients avoid 
seeking care because of the costs involved and the perceived level of quality, 
preferring to wait until a more specialist level of care is needed. The necessity 
of making informal payments was the main source of patient complaints 
(EDRC, 2011). The same research also found that a third of visits to primary 
care providers were made purely in order to receive prescription drugs at a 
discounted rate (EDRC, 2011).
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Fig. 5.1
Outpatient contacts per person per year in the WHO European Region, 
latest available year 
Source: WHO Regional Office for Europe, 2013.
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Huge investments into rural primary care from international donor agencies 
have meant the refurbishment and equipping of all ambulatories in rural areas, 
and the impact on provision of primary care services in project regions has 
been dramatic (Harutyunyan et al., 2010b). Nevertheless, in a survey of primary 
care doctors conducted in 2011, doctors most commonly cited the lack of 
essential equipment and poor accommodation as the main barrier to effective 
working (EDRC, 2011). This finding was supported by evidence from a patient 
satisfaction survey conducted at the same time in which half the respondents 
could not access necessary treatment because of the lack of equipment or 
specialists (EDRC, 2011). There is also a general lack of applying standardized 
laboratory practice to support appropriate diagnostics and evidence-based 
clinical decision-making.
Since 1996, residents of the Republic of Armenia have had the right to 
choose their health care provider, and an open enrolment policy has been in 
place since 2008. In practice, however, the population continue to be assigned to 
primary care providers according to their place of residence (see section 2.9.2). 
Most Armenians directly self-refer to a primary care provider or specialist, 
with the latter seemingly the preferred option because of the low professional 
status and the perceived low quality of primary care services. Primary care 
doctors in Armenia are consequently weak gatekeepers to higher levels of care: 
43% of referrals to hospital in 2009 were patient self-referrals, 39% were from 
specialists working in a primary care setting and only 20% were from primary 
care doctors (WHO Regional Office for Europe, 2009). Also in a context where 
OOP payments are high, they can deter utilization and it may well be seen as 
cheaper to simply self-refer than to pay for a referral from the primary care 
level (see section 7.2).
Family medicine
Key to reforms in primary care has been the introduction of family medicine as 
the integrative “first point of contact” organizational principle for the delivery 
of care and the main direction for improving accessibility of care. Training in 
family medicine began as early as in 1993, with 12 physicians being trained as 
family doctors, although the laws at that time did not permit them to actually 
practise as family physicians. Armenia was one the first countries in the former 
Soviet Union to establish chairs in family medicine and in family nursing in 
1997, thereby providing specialist qualifications in primary care. The Ministry 
of Health recommends that the minimum size for a family medicine practice 
should cover a population of 1000 (300 children and 700 adults), with 2000 
viewed as the optimal size (700 children and 1300 adults) and 2500 (800 children 
and 1700 adults) as the maximum size. Based on these figures, to provide the 
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country with family physicians at the optimal level, a total of 1500–2000 family 
physicians are required. Between 2006 and 2010, 1200 family doctors were 
trained, but their services have not been fully utilized (Armstat et al., 2012).
The introduction of family medicine as the principal organizational core for 
the provision of primary care in Armenia has been, and continues to be, difficult. 
The traditional focus on specialist care has posed a particular challenge, but 
the resistance to family medicine in Yerevan means that primary care doctors 
still practise in either paediatric or adult care. Limited financing under the BBP 
has restricted the ability of newly introduced family physicians to provide a 
broader range of services than with traditional primary care providers. Beyond 
this more specific constraint, family medicine as a concept has yet to gain 
tangible public support. There is little public understanding of the scope of 
services provided by family physicians. A patient satisfaction survey conducted 
in 2010 found that many complained that the family doctors were insufficiently 
well trained (EDRC, 2011). The Demographic and Health Survey 2010 found 
that, of those registered with a primary care physician, 15% of women and 
17% of men were covered by a family doctor; 70% of women and 60% of men 
continued to be covered by a general internist (terapevt) (Armstat et al., 2012). 
Strengthening family medicine as a specialty within the medical profession 
remains a challenge, as does the need to make family medicine a more attractive 
career option among physicians.
5.4 Specialized ambulatory care/inpatient care
Inpatient and specialized ambulatory care is provided in a range of settings 
including free-standing municipal and regional multi-use hospitals; integrated 
multi-use hospitals (networks) with ambulatory care provision; health centres 
with beds for inpatient care; maternity homes, with and without consultation 
units; and specialist clinics (dispensaries) for patients with specific conditions 
(e.g. diabetes, cancer, psychiatric health issues). Hospitals in Armenia enjoy 
a high level of autonomy with regard to determining objectives and specific 
functions, strategic management, administration, financial management and 
procurement as well as human resource management.
Highly specialized care is usually provided through specialized single-
purpose health care structures (hospitals, centres), mainly concentrated in 
Yerevan and with a major focus on complex technologies. Specialized services 
in Armenia are generally organized vertically, thus favouring the concentration 
of resources on a limited range of health problems, and diverting those 
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resources from the development of a more comprehensive health system with 
a seamless service. Hospital capacity in terms of the number of facilities and 
beds in Armenia has fallen considerably since independence, particularly since 
the late 1990s (see section 4.1). Despite these changes, the inpatient system in 
Armenia remains poorly balanced with an oversupply of capacity and staff, 
often providing services to patients who would be more appropriately treated in 
day-care or outpatient settings. Hospital care continues to dominate the national 
health system, absorbing 42.3% of the annual budget in 2012, compared with 
37.2% for primary care (see section 7.5).
5.5 Emergency care
At the time of writing, the emergency care system was in the process of 
reforming, but in 2010, there were 104 ambulance stations across the country, 
which had 6.4 doctors per 100 000 population and 122 people per 100 000 
population had received emergency care (Armstat, 2011b). A patient satisfaction 
survey conducted in 2011 found that half of respondents who had accessed 
emergency care services had paid out of pocket (EDRC, 2011). In February 
2011, the Armenian Government introduced formal co-payments for many adult 
emergency care services – excluding emergency resuscitation (see section 6.1). 
The co-payments apply to all but “socially vulnerable” groups (see section 3.3.1).
5.6 Pharmaceutical care
There are 17 licensed pharmaceutical manufacturers in Armenia all of 
which specialize in manufacturing generics. The market share by value of 
pharmaceuticals produced by domestic manufacturers was around 10% in 
2007. Recent policies have sought to ensure that all Armenian pharmaceutical 
providers are GMP compliant, partly to enable greater international trade 
but also in order to reassure the local population that generic medicines are 
effective and reliable alternatives to brand-name drugs.
Community pharmacies are predominantly private, profit-making 
enterprises. Geographical access to pharmacies in Yerevan and other urban 
areas is good, but while 32% of rural respondents in a household budget survey 
said there was a pharmacy less than a kilometre from their home, for 29% of 
rural inhabitants it is over 10 km (Armstat, 2011a).
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Very few pharmaceuticals are provided through the BBP, and pharmaceuticals 
are a major household expenditure in Armenia (see section 7.2.1). There 
are public programmes to provide free medicines for certain diseases and 
conditions (e.g. tuberculosis, malaria, HIV / AIDS, some psychiatric conditions, 
diabetes) and children under 7 years are also covered. There is also a limited 
list of essential drugs that are made available to particularly vulnerable groups 
either free of charge or at a discounted rate. These were mainly assessed as 
satisfactory by the majority of physicians that took part in the survey; however, 
they mentioned that those drugs should be replaced by more effective ones 
and about one-third of participating physicians mentioned the ineffectiveness 
of drugs provided to population groups with benefits, and insisted on a review 
of the drug list and supplementing it with modern, more effective ones. The 
vast majority of people that took part in the survey were not satisfied with the 
effectiveness of drugs provided to them for free or with discount (EDRC, 2011). 
The same study also identified some issues with the quality of pharmaceuticals 
being made available as 12% of patients responding to the survey said that they 
had been dispensed with drugs that were beyond their expiry date and less than 
half of those affected returned the drugs to obtain a replacement (EDRC, 2011).
5.7 Rehabilitation/intermediate care
Rehabilitation/intermediate care in Armenia is generally organized as hospital-
based clinical services for the chronically ill and/or temporarily or permanently 
disabled. Care for patients with severe physical and functional impairment, 
particularly in rural areas, is often inappropriate as it frequently involves 
rehabilitative services even though long-term care might be more appropriate 
(see section 5.8).
The most comprehensive facilities are the International Post-Trauma 
Rehabilitation Centre for patients with spinal cord injuries and the Children’s 
Rehabilitation Centre. Created in the early 1990s with donor aid, the two centres 
have established close links with health and social services, thus facilitating the 
coordination of long-term treatment and physical/occupational rehabilitation 
(kinesiotherapy, professional and physical rehabilitation) with social services. 
The centres offer modern rehabilitation services provided by newly trained 
physiotherapists. In contrast, rehabilitation services in municipal polyclinics 
and general hospitals are less comprehensive, provided by traditionally trained 
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physiotherapists and nurses. Services involve a range of applied physical 
agents, exercises, bathing, massage and manual therapy. There is also a 
Physiotherapeutic Centre providing rehabilitation services.
5.8 Long-term care
There are virtually no dedicated facilities for long-term care as the responsibility 
for care falls mainly to families. There are very few nursing homes available in 
Armenia and home-based care services are not available to the extent necessary 
to allow older persons to stay in their homes (UNECE, 2011). There is a general 
view that the current approach to long-term care, or more specifically its 
absence, has considerable financial implications for patients and their families 
and for the system in general, particularly with current labour migration trends.
For residential long-term care, there are four state homes for the elderly and 
the disabled, caring for an estimated 1000 elderly and disabled people, all of 
which are under the Ministry of Social Protection. Two facilities exclusively 
care for old-age pensioners who cannot live independently and do not have any 
relatives. One facility is dedicated to the care of disabled who are unable to 
live independently and do not have any relatives (in Gyumri) and the Vardenis 
home looks after people with neurological or psychiatric conditions and is under 
the Ministry of Health. Three private care homes for the elderly look after 90 
residents (Armstat, 2010). In addition, there are eight orphanages, which are 
home to approximately 950 children, two of which specialize in the care of 
children with learning difficulties (Hakobyan et al., 2006). There are also three 
private nursing homes working on a fee-for-service basis (UNECE, 2011).
5.9 Services for informal carers
The general model for long-term care of older, sick or disabled relatives is 
informal care within the family. Multigenerational households are the norm and 
facilitate informal caregiving, despite an increasing number of younger couples 
seeking to live independently and an increasing number of older people living 
alone (UNECE, 2011). The needs of informal carers have not been considered 
systematically and measures such as respite care, day-care centres or financial 
assistance are not currently available apart from a few small projects run by 
international NGOs.
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5.10 Palliative care
Palliative care is not widely available in Armenia; there are no hospices or 
specialist palliative care units. Palliative care is not recognized as a specialty 
and is not covered under the BBP. Given the number of cancer deaths annually, 
it is likely that there is significant unmet demand for palliative care services. 
An initiative on the promotion and development of palliative care has been 
supported by the Open Society Institute, so it is hoped that there will shortly 
be more development in this area.
5.11 Mental health care
Mental health services in Armenia are sorely lacking, and what is available is 
poorly integrated into the primary care system. The current system focuses 
on inpatient care, and a lack of appropriately trained social workers and 
other mental health care providers further limits the potential for providing 
services at ambulatory and community levels. Essentially, psychiatric care is 
still exclusively provided in specialized mental health institutions including 
hospitals and social psychoneurological centres. There is an overcapacity of 
beds and staff in psychiatric hospitals, leading to the unnecessary admission of 
patients with chronic conditions who would be more appropriately treated in an 
outpatient, community setting (Hakobyan et al., 2006). It has been estimated that 
in 2009, 3% of total health expenditure went to mental health services, and more 
than 88% of all mental health expenditure goes to funding hospital care. There 
are four day centres in Yerevan, one in Syunik region and two in Gegharkunik 
region, which cover 3–5% of general need (Soghoyan & Gasparyan, 2010). 
Mental health care, including essential psychotropic medicines, is included in 
the BBP. Patients with chronic mental health problems are able to register as 
disabled and receive disability benefit payments.
There is no systematic approach to developing community mental health 
services except for some small-scale pilots, usually supported by international 
organizations. Following the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh and the resulting 
mass population movements, international aid agencies and NGOs started many 
projects to diversify mental health services and provide day-care services and 
other alternatives to inpatient services, but these projects targeted mainly the 
refugee population and the services ended when the external funding ceased 
(Soghoyan & Gasparyan, 2010).
Health systems in transition  Armenia 73
The future development of mental health care is centred on the further 
development of outpatient rather than inpatient services, the creation of 
community-based services and the improvement of public education about 
mental health issues in order to address the stigmatization of patients.
5.12 Complementary and alternative medicine
Alternative/complementary medicine was formally recognized as a 
specialization in 1977 as it refers to reflex therapy; homeopathy was added 
in 2001. Since then, alternative/complementary medicine has been considered 
mainstream in the health care system in Armenia. Alternative/complementary 
medicine in Armenia may only be practised by physicians since it requires 
a university qualification in clinical medicine and one year of postgraduate 
specialization (residency) or short retraining courses in various key areas such 
as acupuncture, herbal medicine, reflex therapy, manual therapy, bioresonance 
testing, pulse testing, homeopathy and others.
Postgraduate training in the field of alternative/complementary medicine is 
offered at the Department and Centre of Alternative and Traditional Medicine 
at the National Institute of Health. Training has been developed in cooperation 
with international consultants in the preparation of curricula, textbooks and 
other teaching materials. Alternative/complementary services are generally not 
covered by any type of third-party payer and are, therefore, financed through 
direct payments (Hakobyan et al., 2006).

6. P
rin
cip
al h
ealth
 refo
rm
s
6. Principal health reforms
In 2006, the BBP was broadened to include a package of primary care services for the whole population that was formally free at the point of use, but this was not accompanied with increased funding for primary care 
services. New funding mechanisms were piloted in 2010–2011 to improve 
productivity in the sector and encourage doctors to take on patients and roles 
they had hitherto resisted.
In 2008, the Armenian Government introduced the Obstetric Care State 
Certificate (OCSC) to ensure all women had access to high-quality maternity 
services that were free at the point of use. Pregnant women started to receive 
their OCSCs from 1 July 2008 and they were eligible from the 22nd week of 
pregnancy. The women use OCSCs to pay for care at their chosen maternity 
hospital, with the SHA paying a fixed fee depending on the complexity of the 
delivery and the type of facility. The reimbursement rates were revised by the 
Ministry of Health to reflect market rates. There was initial opposition from 
hospital managers and obstetricians, but the Programme is now considered a 
success, particularly as OOP payments for deliveries have fallen substantially.
The Child Health State Certificate (CHSC) was introduced on a similar basis 
as insufficient funding of inpatient paediatric services through the BBP led to 
high OOP costs for patients, which acted as a significant barrier to care. The 
introduction of the CHSC in 2011 has also been successful in reducing informal 
payments, improving affordability and access to services and boosting patient 
satisfaction.
The key factors in the success of the state certificate programmes have been 
the clear political commitment with the associated financial commitment to 
covering the full cost of maternity and paediatric services. Their future success 
relies on consistent and transparent funding for service providers that grants 
health workers a good salary.
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In February 2011, the Armenian Government introduced formal co-payments 
for many adult emergency care services with the exception of some “socially 
vulnerable” groups. The decision was taken against a backdrop of increasing 
financial austerity and the aim is for these co-payments to increase government 
revenues by “formalizing” informal payments for services and for prices to 
better reflect true costs.
From January 2012, some public sector employees have been eligible to 
receive a voucher to purchase a private health insurance package and other 
cover. The stated purpose was to make government employment attractive and 
to address employees’ social needs given their relatively low wages, but it raised 
fundamental challenge to equity in the health system.
The Ministry of Health has launched a process to define a National Health 
Strategy for Armenia. It will provide a plan for establishing common ground 
between stakeholders where improving the health of the population is given 
priority and an intersectoral strategy to achieve this end; this may be considered 
one of the more significant recent developments in health care reform.
6.1 Analysis of recent reforms
The main directions in health system reform since Armenia gained independence 
from the Soviet Union have included the rapid decentralization of health care 
services, the privatization of many providers, the separating of purchasing and 
provider functions and the introduction of family medicine as the cornerstone 
of primary care. The history of reforms undertaken before 2006 is described 
in section 2.2 and in the previous edition of this report (Hakobyan et al., 2006). 
Major recent policies (from 2006 to 2012) and their objectives are presented 
in Box 6.1. In future reform, efforts are to be guided by the National Health 
Strategy, which was under development at the time of writing (see section 6.2).
Box 6.1
Major reforms and policy initiatives in Armenia from 2006
2006 – 2007 Providing universal access to primary care services
2008 Obstetric Care State Certificate Programme
2010 – 2011 New primary health care payment mechanisms
2011 Child Health State Certificate Programme
2011 and 2012 Co-payments under BBP
2012 Social package for civil servants
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Primary care reforms
In 2006, the BBP was broadened to include a package of primary care services 
for the whole population that was formally free at the point of use. This was 
on paper a significant development, but it was not accompanied with sufficient 
funding for primary care services so the gap between what was only nominally 
funded from the budget and the funds needed to provide the service were 
covered through informal payments. New funding mechanisms were piloted 
in 2010–2011, and these sought to introduce elements of performance-related 
pay (see section 3.7.2), but the focus was on improving productivity in the sector 
and encouraging doctors to take on patients and roles they had hitherto resisted. 
These payments were successful in shaping the priorities and productivity of 
family doctors, and for this reason they will be rolled out nationwide. However, 
although the bonus payments did increase the salaries of family doctors, their 
salaries remain low. Another significant development in primary care has been 
the piloting of the Medical Institution Data Analysis System (MIDAS-3) for 
electronic patient records, which has now been rolled out nationwide (Yoder 
& Johansen, 2010).
The state certificate programmes
The CHSC Programme was introduced in 2011 and sought to build on the 
successes of the OCSC Programme in improving access to care and so improve 
mother and child health. Although deliveries, antenatal and postnatal care as 
well as paediatric services have always been covered under the BBP to be 
available to all Armenians with no co-payments, in reality substantial informal 
payments were required when accessing such services. In 2008, the Armenian 
Government introduced the OCSC in order to curb informal payments and 
ensure that all women had access to high-quality maternity services that were 
free at the point of use. The objectives were:
• to provide high-quality and accessible health care services
• to move services from the informal to the formal sector
• to improve doctor–patient relations
• to guarantee social equity in the provision of maternity services.
In the development phase, the Ministry of Health formed a working group 
that consulted widely with NGOs, specialists and the mass media. Moreover, 
the working group gathered baseline data on the projected birth rate; this was 
fed into a costed proposal that was approved and an implementation schedule 
was developed (Truzyan, Grigoryan & Krajewski-Siuda, 2010). The Ministry 
of Health gathered data on the number of births, caesarean section deliveries, 
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the number of deliveries at each maternity hospital, and the mothers’ residences. 
The Minister of Health sent monitors to the Yerevan maternity hospitals to 
check implementation and to report results directly to the Minister. A major 
information campaign was also launched to raise awareness among pregnant 
women of their right to access free services under the OCSC Programme. 
Pregnant women started to receive their certificates from 1 July 2008 and they 
were eligible to use these from the 22nd week of pregnancy. The women use 
these certificates to pay for care at their chosen maternity hospital, and the 
SHA pays the hospitals a fixed fee depending on the complexity of the delivery. 
The reimbursement rates were set by the Ministry of Health but were deemed 
to reflect market rates; in 2010 the payment rates ranged from 70 200 dram 
for physiological birth at a regional hospital to 231 800 dram for a caesarean 
section in a Yerevan specialist hospital.
There was initial opposition from hospital managers and obstetricians, but the 
OCSC Programme is now considered a success, particularly as OOP payments 
for deliveries have fallen substantially, even though informal payments have 
not been eradicated. Doctor–patient relations have also improved as a direct 
result of medical staff no longer needing to elicit informal payments (Truzyan, 
Grigoryan & Krajewski-Siuda, 2010).
The key factor in the success of the OCSC has been the clear political 
commitment to the OCSC Programme with the associated financial commitment 
to covering the full cost of maternity services. The fact that the initiative 
has been financed from the existing health budget rather than international 
donors has also supported its sustainability, although budget cuts in 2011 could 
conceivably lead to a countervailing rise in informal payments. However, many 
of the increasing costs have been associated with mothers choosing to deliver in 
Yerevan (even if there is no clinical need and they live outside the capital) and 
the increase in caesarean sections as the reimbursement rates are higher under 
these circumstances. Policy-makers have been exploring options to restrict the 
flow of women from the regions close to Yerevan for normal deliveries. The 
increase in caesarean sections resulted from the reimbursement system creating 
incentives for obstetricians to perform higher-cost interventions rather than 
being part of broader historical trends or patient preferences (Tadevosyan, 2011).
The CHSC Programme was introduced on a similar basis, the insufficient 
funding of inpatient paediatric services through the BBP led to high OOP costs 
for patients, which acted as a significant barrier to care. The introduction of 
the CHSC and Child Health Passport from 1 January 2011 has been successful 
in reducing informal payments, improving affordability and access to services 
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and boosting patient satisfaction (Crape et al., 2011). Under this Programme, the 
SHA anticipated that the average salary for a paediatrician would increase from 
40 000–50 000 dram in 2010 to 200 000–230 000 dram in 2011 (Crape et al., 
2011). The CHSC covers all children under 7 years of age, vulnerable children 
under 18 years and all children under 18 years for emergency care. The hospital 
is reimbursed for care once it submits the unique certificate number along 
with details of services provided; the hospital keeps a copy of the certificate 
along with the child’s medical records. As the certificates are distributed at 
birth, neonatal services for babies are covered. In the first year, the Programme 
reduced the number of households making informal payments from 63.9% 
to 20.6% in Yerevan and from 47.4% to 8.9% in the regions; the reported 
mean spending fell from 35 329 dram at baseline to 17 751 dram at midterm 
in regional hospitals, although the mean amount did not fall significantly in 
Yerevan hospitals. The reduction in, if not elimination of, informal payments 
still served to improve access to services for families (Crape et al., 2011).
The future success of the State Certificate Programmes relies on consistent 
and transparent funding for service providers that can grant them a good salary. 
This would appear to be a key policy that is effective at reducing informal 
payments in the health system and it could also be central to the improvement 
of accountability in the system (see section 7.6).
Co-payments for emergency care
In February 2011, the Armenian Government introduced formal co-payments 
for many (23 of 53) adult emergency care services excluding emergency 
resuscitation. The co-payments apply to all but “socially vulnerable” groups 
(see section 3.3.1). In October 2012, co-payments were introduced for oncology 
services and treatment for sexually transmitted diseases. The decisions were 
taken against a backdrop of increasing financial austerity and with the support 
of many transnational partners. The aim is for these co-payments to increase 
government revenues by “formalizing” informal payments for services, which 
would also serve to improve transparency in the system. However, experience 
elsewhere in the region has shown that the introduction of co-payments is 
more likely to increase the overall price of accessing care as they are levied in 
addition to informal payments (Gaál, Jakab & Shishkin, 2010). This restricts 
access for patients with lower income and introduces a much more regressive 
payment approach.
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Social Package for civil servants
From January 2012, government and some public sector employees (i.e. those 
in the civil service, education and social care sector and some in the arts) have 
been eligible to receive a voucher worth 132 000 dram (US$ 334), 52 000 dram 
(US$ 131) of which must be used to purchase a private health insurance package 
and 80 000 dram (US$ 203) to be spent on buying additional cover, VHI for one 
family member, or vacation services or school fees. The policy has increased 
VHI revenues by 4.5-fold since the introduction of the Social Package. The 
stated purpose was to make government employment attractive and to address 
employees’ social needs; however, it raises fundamental challenges to health 
system goals around equity in the system. By using considerable resources to 
purchase cover for these public sector employees, the resource-base for existing 
health commitments is reduced, and giving these funds to competing private 
insurers fragments financial pooling. Risk pooling will also be limited as the 
population covered is relatively low risk for ill health. Investing public money 
to boost private insurance industry also carries long-term risks as once it is 
well-established the industry acts as a strong interest group against universal 
coverage and greater regulation of private insurance (Roberts et al., 2008). This 
is particularly pertinent in Armenia where there is a lack of monitoring and 
transparency measures in place for the insurance industry, and the current 
regulatory framework is not health market specific.
6.2 Future developments
The Ministry of Health has launched a process to define a National Health 
Strategy for Armenia with the overall aim of building consensus on a vision 
for increasing the health system’s capacity in order to improve the health status 
of the Armenian people. It will also provide a plan for establishing common 
ground between stakeholders, where improving the health of the population 
is given priority, and an intersectoral strategy to achieve this end; this may be 
considered one of the most significant developments in health care reform.
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7. Assessment of the health system
OOP payments as a proportion of total health expenditure are comparatively high in Armenia and this, in combination with quite high rates of poverty, is associated with high rates of catastrophic 
and impoverishing household health expenditure. Patients who are not poor 
pay considerably more out of pocket for health services than the poor and 
extremely poor, but as the overall OOP cost of treatment is high, there is a 
real risk of catastrophic health care costs. Even those eligible for the BBP face 
considerable OOP costs when accessing services; limits in the BBP mean that 
many expensive aspects of health care are not covered – particularly hospital 
care and outpatient pharmaceuticals.
By their very nature, OOP payments are highly regressive as poorer 
households pay a greater proportion of their income for health services than 
richer households. The high share of OOP payments in total health expenditure 
(57.4% in 2011) is, therefore, the greatest challenge to equity in health system 
financing in Armenia. The state certificate programmes have been successful 
in strengthening financial protection, with OOP payments for paediatric and 
maternal health services falling sharply, but other sectors are still chronically 
underfunded. The de facto shallowness and narrowness of cover explain the 
high levels of OOP payments. The known high level of OOP payments when 
accessing care means that for many Armenians seeking health care is considered 
unaffordable. Ensuring equity in access to services, therefore, remains one of 
the key challenges for policy-makers in Armenia.
Hospital care continues to dominate the national health system, although 
hospital capacity in terms of the number of facilities and beds in Armenia 
has fallen considerably since independence, particularly since the late 1990s. 
However, the reductions were almost exclusively limited to hospitals outside the 
capital city and the estimated savings were largely achieved through closure or 
repurposing of small rural hospitals and the reduction of bed numbers in regional 
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and urban hospitals through changed financing mechanisms. Nevertheless, the 
inpatient system in Armenia remains poorly balanced, with an oversupply of 
capacity and staff in the capital, often providing services to patients who would 
be more appropriately treated in day-care or outpatient settings.
Health policy development and implementation vary in the degree to which 
it is transparent, but there is an increasing trend towards broad stakeholder 
consultation in policy development even if this does not yet truly extend down 
to the level of public participation in the process. The key challenge to greater 
transparency in the health system is the pervasiveness of informal payments.
The greater clarity around priorities in the health system afforded by the 
National Health Strategy should facilitate greater health system performance 
monitoring, and monitoring of progress towards health goals; this should build 
even greater capacity for performance monitoring and accountability, thus 
strengthening in the health system.
7.1 The stated objectives of the health system
Armenia accepts the following basic health values (Hakobyan et al., 2006):
• health and health care as a fundamental human right;
• equity in health and solidarity in action to achieve developed health 
standards; and
• collaboration and accountability of different individuals and institutions 
for continuous health development.
According to these values, the country also acknowledges internationally 
recognized health policy goals, namely to promote and protect people’s health 
throughout the lifespan and to reduce the incidence of main diseases and 
injuries and decrease the suffering they cause.
7.2 Financial protection and equity in financing
7.2.1 Financial protection
The high level of OOP payments as a proportion of total health expenditure 
in Armenia plus the quite high rates of poverty can create catastrophic and 
impoverishing household health expenditure. Patients who are not poor pay 
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considerably more out of pocket for health services than the poor and extremely 
poor patients (on average they paid 3548, 1320 and 562 dram, respectively) but 
as the overall cost of treatment is high, the burden is greatest on the poor and 
has a real risk of catastrophic health care costs. In 2010, health expenditures 
accounted for 14.2% of total household expenditures on services (Armstat, 
2011a); in 2009, it was 11.2% (Armstat, 2010). Even those eligible for the BBP 
face considerable OOP payments when accessing services: in 2010, the average 
OOP payment to a family doctor was found to be 172 dram, while a hospital 
specialist was paid on average 3418 dram and in a diagnostics centre the average 
OOP payment for a patient eligible for BBP was 4268 dram (Armstat, 2011a). 
However, the main OOP expenditure is on pharmaceuticals, which are generally 
purchased at full cost price. In 2010, on average, spending on pharmaceuticals 
accounted for 4% (up from 2.3% in 2009) of total household expenditure; 
average monthly per capita expenditure was 1521 dram for the non-poor, 
510 dram for the poor and 190 dram for the extremely poor (Armstat, 2011a). 
The high level of OOP payments when accessing care means that for many 
Armenians, seeking health care is considered unaffordable. The Demographic 
and Health Survey 2010 found that 50% of women who did not seek primary 
care services when they needed it cited cost as the main factor, while 40% of 
men did (Armstat et al., 2012).
The high level of OOP payments is the result of a mixture of both formal and 
informal payments, and the reasons for the persistence of informal payments 
in the system are complex. However, it is clear that the high levels of OOP 
expenditure are related to the breadth, scope and depth of cover. In 2009, 18% 
of the Armenian population was entitled to the BBP; by poverty status this was 
55% of the extremely poor, 18% of the poor and 17% of the non-poor (Armstat, 
2010). This shows that the BBP does not reliably provide the breadth of cover 
to those most in need, while 82% of the population were excluded from the 
nominally universal package of benefits. It is unlikely that the scheme for public 
purchasing of VHI cover for certain public sector workers will significantly 
improve the breadth of cover for the population. The restricted scope of services 
available to the whole population (primary care, emergency care, sanitary-
epidemiological services and treatment for 200 socially significant diseases) 
means that many expensive aspects of health care are not covered – particularly 
hospital care and outpatient pharmaceuticals. However, underfunding of the 
BBP as a whole means that the actual depth of cover is also a key factor in 
explaining the high levels of OOP payments in the system.
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OOP payments in the system have remained stubbornly high, but there have 
been initiatives to strengthen financial protection and improve access to care 
in some specific areas of the system – notably mother and child health. These 
initiatives were successful in strengthening financial protection, with OOP 
payments for paediatric and maternal health services falling sharply following 
the introduction of the CHSC and OCSC Programmes (Truzyan, Grigoryan & 
Krajewski-Siuda, 2010; Crape et al., 2011).
7.2.2 Equity in financing
The high share of OOP payments in total health expenditure (57.4% in 2011) is 
the greatest challenge to equity in health system financing in Armenia. By their 
very nature, OOP payments are highly regressive as poorer households pay a 
greater proportion of their income for health services than richer households. 
State funding for health accounted for 35.8% of total health expenditure in 2011, 
but a relatively small share of budgetary revenues are raised through direct 
taxation and indirect taxes are mainly collected at the border (see section 3.3.2). 
Budgetary funding is, therefore, not as regressive as it would be if it relied on 
domestically collected final consumption taxes such as VAT, but it is not as 
progressive as it would be if redistributive income taxation was fully operational.
In this context, the new scheme for purchasing private health insurance 
cover for civil servants and certain other state-sector workers is not something 
that will improve equity in financing, indeed it may well have the opposite 
effect (see section 6.1).
7.3 User experience and equity of access to health care
7.3.1 User experience
Patient satisfaction surveys show relatively high levels of satisfaction with the 
health system, which has improved over time (Footman et al., 2013). One survey 
of primary care in two regions found that 78% of respondents considered the 
care they received to be “excellent” or “good”; however, these high levels of 
patient satisfaction actually ref lect lower expectations rather than better 
quality (Harutyunyan et al., 2010a, 2010b) (see section 2.9.4). Similarly, women 
delivering in rural regions were more satisfied with the quality of maternity 
services they received than women delivering in Yerevan, despite the fact that 
services and facilities were of better quality in Yerevan (Truzyan, Grigoryan & 
Krajewski-Siuda, 2010). While some initiatives have improved user experience, 
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this has been achieved alongside the core aims of the initiative, which was to 
improve access to and quality of services for mother and child health (Truzyan, 
Grigoryan & Krajewski-Siuda, 2010; Crape et al., 2011). Waiting times are 
not a significant feature of the health system in Armenia, as hospitals are 
underutilized and so do not impact on user experience.
7.3.2 Equity of access to health care
Formally the BBP is uniform across the population with a few vulnerable groups 
having access to a more generous range of services. However, while self-rated 
health in Armenia appears to vary little by gender or economic status, since 
poverty has fallen in the country (Demirchyan, Petrosyan & Thompson, 2012) 
the utilization of health services is more frequent for non-poor than it is for the 
poor, which would indicate that there is persistent inequity in access to health 
care services. In 2010, 88.4% of the total population considered their health to 
be satisfactory, good or very good while 11.6% rated their health as bad or very 
bad, with little variation by economic status. Of the non-poor, 12.3% rated their 
health as bad or very bad, as did 10.1% of the poor and 11.6% of the extremely 
poor (Armstat, 2011a). However, of the non-poor who had experienced illness in 
the past 12 months, 41.6% consulted a doctor for advice or treatment, whereas 
only 30% of the poor did and just 24.1% of the extremely poor did (Armstat, 
2011a). There are considerable barriers to accessing health services and the 
use of services is related to a patient’s ability to pay rather than just need. For 
the poorest quintile, spending on health care services is 19 times lower than 
the average. Equity in access to services, remains one of the key remaining 
challenges for policy-makers in Armenia. Surveys conducted in 2001 and 2010 
showed no substantial improvement in access to care in Armenia (Balabanova 
et al., 2004;  Balabanova et al., 2012).
7.4 Health outcomes, health service outcomes and 
quality of care
7.4.1 Population health
Issues with the completeness and level of detail available for cause of mortality 
in Armenia make the use of amenable mortality as an indicator inappropriate. 
Overall, life expectancy in Armenia is reasonably high for countries of the 
former Soviet Union; however, this masks a considerable gender gap and low 
disability-adjusted life expectancy nationwide (see section 1.4). In 2009, life 
Health systems in transition  Armenia86
expectancy at birth for women was 76.9 years, which was 6.3 years longer 
than that for men (70.6 years), and the all-cause mortality rate was 55% higher 
for men than for women. However, the disability-adjusted life expectancy 
for Armenian women was calculated in 2007 to be just 59.1 years; for men it 
was 63.1 years (WHO Regional Office for Europe, 2013). Noncommunicable 
diseases predominate as the main causes of mortality: 51% of total mortality 
could be attributed to diseases of the circulatory system while 18% could be 
attributed to cancer (see section 1.4). Lifestyle factors are, therefore, of central 
importance in determining population health, and tobacco consumption is the 
key health issue facing the Armenian population. Most Armenian men smoke 
and even though few Armenian women do, many women and children are 
exposed to tobacco smoke in the home. In 2003, 60% of total mortality in 
Armenia could be attributed to smoking-related causes (WHO Regional Office 
for Europe, 2013).
7.4.2 Health service outcomes and quality of care
Target values for the 2006–2015 National Programme for the Early Detection, 
Treatment and Prevention of Cervical Cancer in Armenia can be used to reflect 
the efficiency of both primary care (early detection) and secondary care (early 
treatment). The target is to halve the cervical cancer mortality rate (from 8.6 
per 100 000 women in 2005 to 6.5 in 2010 and 4.3 in 2015) and reduce the 
proportion of advanced cancer from 47% in 2005 to 23.5% in 2010 and 14.1% 
in 2015. This is to be achieved in part through the introduction of a screening 
programme (Pap smear) to cover 50% of the target population in 2010 and 80% 
in 2015. So far as can be ascertained from data available in the Health for All 
database, there certainly has been a strong downward trend in cervical cancer 
deaths in Armenia since the early 2000s, while there has been a very strong 
growth in the number of new cases of cervical cancer being identified since 
2005 (WHO Regional Office for Europe, 2013).
Improvements in infant, maternal and under-5 mortality rates are generally 
more closely associated with wider improvements in living conditions, but 
survey data have shown that there have also been demonstrable improvements 
in antenatal care coverage and maternity care. In 2010, 99% of women saw a 
health care professional at least once for antenatal care for the most recent birth, 
compared with 93% in 2005 (Armstat et al., 2012). Regional differences in the 
proportion of women in labour being attended by a skilled health professional 
have been less; as a result, while the improvement in the national average is just 
2% (from 97% to 99%), in Gegharkunik region the rate increased from 84% to 
97% and in Aragatsotn region it increased from 88% in 2005 to 100% in 2010 
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(Armstat et al., 2012). It is likely that improvements in antenatal care coverage 
can be directly attributed to the implementation of the OCSC Programme from 
2008 (see section 6.1). There is a discrepancy between immunization coverage 
rates between information collected through the health system and survey data, 
but both have shown considerable improvements in immunization coverage 
since 2005 (see section 1.4).
However, a very detailed analysis of health service outcomes and quality of 
care across the health system is complicated by the weak regulation of health 
care providers, particularly hospitals, in Armenia. Data such as patient-reported 
outcome measures are not routinely collected and admission and readmission 
rates for specific conditions are not collated centrally as quality indicators.
7.4.3 Equity of outcomes
Data and studies on health services outcomes in Armenia cannot yet be 
meaningfully broken down by socioeconomic group, gender or geographical 
region.
7.5 Health system efficiency
7.5.1 Allocative efficiency
According to the Armenian Government Programme 2008–2012, the health 
sector was meant to be a priority within government expenditure policy and 
primary care was the priority in health spending on the understanding that 
this would be the most efficient use of scarce resources. However, targets for 
increasing government expenditure on health as a proportion of GDP were not 
met (see section 3.1). The Medium-term Expenditure Framework 2013–2015 
seeks to allocate 34.7% of total government health expenditure to financing 
primary and ambulatory care in 2013, rising to 35.9% in 2014 and 39.6% in 
2015 (Government of Armenia, 2012). However, it is not clear that this level of 
funding will actually go to primary care given that targets for health spending 
are not always met and the mechanisms for setting priorities on a day-to-day 
basis are not explicit. It is also less ambitious than previous targets, which 
projected that the share of expenditure allocated to primary care would increase 
to 50% by 2015 (Hakobyan et al., 2006).
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Hospital care, therefore, continues to dominate the national health system, 
absorbing 42.3% of the annual budget in 2012, although hospital capacity in 
terms of the number of facilities and beds in Armenia has fallen considerably 
since independence, particularly since the late 1990s (see section 4.1). 
However, the reductions were almost exclusively limited to hospitals outside 
the capital city. In the early stages of optimisation the estimated savings were 
largely achieved through closure of small rural hospitals and the reduction 
of bed numbers in regional and urban hospitals but a significant reduction of 
excess infrastructure has been achieved since then through mergers and the 
consolidation of services (see section 4.1). The inpatient system in Yerevan 
remains poorly balanced, with an oversupply of capacity and staff, often 
providing services to patients who would be more appropriately treated in 
day-care or outpatient settings. The privatization of hospitals in Yerevan has 
greatly complicated the consolidation of services in the capital. There has been 
a significant improvement in productivity indicators at regional hospitals where 
consolidation was followed by investments in infrastructure.
There are no specific mechanisms for using evidence of effectiveness and 
cost–effectiveness in priority setting or policy development, although this is 
something that the Ministry of Health is keen to develop. Risk-adjusted resource 
allocation formulae are used in paying for primary care services where age is 
taken into account for per capita payments for enrolled patients; however, more 
subtle formulae are in development (see section 3.7.1).
7.5.2 Technical efficiency
It is challenging to assess the technical efficiency of the health system in 
Armenia as many of the data required are either not collected to a sufficient 
level of detail or are not widely available. Overall total health expenditure 
as a proportion of GDP or in terms of purchasing power parity is very low, 
but this does not indicate that the system overall has high levels of technical 
efficiency. Although the number of acute care beds has fallen consistently since 
independence, occupancy rates have improved since they reached their lowest 
point in 2000, at 57.3% in 2010 (see Fig. 4.3a). The average length of stay in 
acute care hospitals has also halved since 1994 so the improved occupancy rate 
could reflect either greater efficiency in hospital care or some improvements in 
access to care, or some combination of the two.
More policy efforts have focused on improving the productivity of primary 
care doctors through incentive payments and on attempting to build capacity 
for high-quality generic drug manufacturing to increase the take-up of generic 
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pharmaceutical products as a more efficient use of resources. However, these 
efforts aim to improve consumer confidence not just changing prescribing 
practices as both are essential for generic prescribing to contribute to greater 
efficiency in pharmaceutical spending (see section 5.6). Pilot projects using 
bonus payments for primary care doctors encouraged family doctors to provide 
ongoing care for patients with chronic conditions without referring them to 
more specialist services. However, overall wages in the health sector remain 
extremely low (see section 3.7.2). In order to reduce the brain drain and brain 
waste that contribute to waste in human resources for health, more needs to be 
done to attract and retain high-calibre health workers, particularly in rural areas.
7.6 Transparency and accountability
Health policy development and implementation vary in the degree to which 
it is transparent, but there is an increasing trend towards broad stakeholder 
consultation in policy development even if this does not yet truly extend 
down to the level of public participation in the process. The shifting nature of 
the BBP made it hard for patients to know what their entitlements were, but 
there have been consistent efforts with the development of state certificate 
programmes to ensure that at least in maternal and child health patients are 
aware of their benefits and entitlements (see section 6.1). However, the key 
challenge to greater transparency in the health system is the pervasiveness of 
informal payments.
The health system does not stand apart from its wider social context because 
in any country it is a significant part of the economy and a key employer. 
Informal activities in the Armenian health system, therefore, need to be seen in 
the context of the wider economy where informal economic activities accounted 
for 11.2% of GDP in 2008, where tax evasion is the norm and where most of the 
working population rely on the informal sector for their livelihoods (Armstat, 
2012a). However, for health and social care sectors, labour productivity in 
the informal economy is 11.2 times higher than it is in the formal economy, 
meaning that most income is earned informally. By contrast, for example, in 
the construction industry, labour productivity in the formal sector is three times 
higher than it is in the informal economy. Tackling informality in the system is 
a great challenge, but experience from the state certificate programmes shows 
that it is possible to reduce the burden of informal payments in the system, even 
in Armenia’s specific cultural and social context (see section 6.1).
The main focus of recent reform efforts have been around improving the 
transparency of the health system through tackling informal payments rather 
than specifically seeking to improve accountability in the system. However, 
the greater clarity around priorities in the health system afforded by the 
National Health Strategy will facilitate greater health system performance 
monitoring, and monitoring progress towards these goals should build even 
greater capacity for performance monitoring and accountability strengthening 
in the health system.
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8. Conclusions
Since independence, the health care system in Armenia has undergone numerous changes that have effectively transformed a centrally run state system into a fragmented health care system that is largely financed 
from OOP payments. OOP payments reduce access to essential services for the 
poorest households and many households face catastrophic and impoverishing 
household health expenditure. Although the socioeconomic challenges the 
country faced in the 1990s were eclipsed by strong economic growth from 
2000 until the global economic crisis, poverty remains a serious social issue. 
Even those eligible for the BBP face considerable OOP costs when accessing 
services. Limits in the BBP mean that many expensive aspects of health care are 
not covered – particularly hospital care and outpatient pharmaceuticals. By their 
very nature, OOP payments are highly regressive as poorer households pay a 
greater proportion of their income for health services than richer households. 
The high share of OOP payments in total health expenditure (57.4% in 2011) 
is, therefore, the greatest challenge to equity in health system financing 
in Armenia.
The success of the state certificate programmes in strengthening financial 
protection, with OOP payments for paediatric and maternal health services 
falling sharply, has the potential to guide very real improvements in equity in 
financing and in access to services. These remain the key challenges for policy-
makers in Armenia because, despite the achievements of the state certificate 
programmes, other sectors are still chronically underfunded. Underfunding of 
the BBP as a whole means that the de facto depth of cover can explain the high 
levels of OOP payments in the system.
The Armenian health system has also retained an emphasis on inpatient 
services despite concerted efforts to reform primary care provision. Hospital 
care continues to dominate the national health system, although hospital 
capacity in terms of the number of facilities and beds in Armenia has fallen 
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considerably since independence, particularly since the late 1990s. However, 
the reductions were almost exclusively limited to hospitals outside the capital 
city and the estimated savings were largely achieved through closure of small 
rural hospitals and the reduction of bed numbers in regional and urban hospitals. 
The inpatient system in Yerevan, therefore, remains poorly balanced with an 
oversupply of capacity and staff, often providing services to patients who 
would be more appropriately treated elsewhere. This remains a key challenge 
in improving efficiency of the Armenian health system.
Nevertheless, despite the challenges ahead, the Armenian experience shows 
that with concerted, well-targeted efforts it has proved possible to reduce 
informal payments in the health system and thereby improve access to services 
for the poorest households. The greater clarity around priorities in the health 
system which will be afforded by the National Health Strategy will facilitate 
greater health system performance monitoring and monitoring of progress 
towards health goals; it also has the potential to build even greater capacity for 
performance monitoring and accountability strengthening in the health system.
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9.2 Useful web sites
All the below have Armenian, English and Russian language versions:
National Statistical Service of the Republic of Armenia (Armstat) 
http://www.armstat.am/
President of the Republic of Armenia official web site 
http://www.president.am/
The Government of the Republic of Armenia official web site 
http://www.gov.am/
9.3 HiT methodology and production process
HiTs are produced by country experts in collaboration with the Observatory’s 
research directors and staff. They are based on a template that, revised 
periodically, provides detailed guidelines and specific questions, definitions, 
suggestions for data sources, and examples needed to compile reviews. While 
the template offers a comprehensive set of questions, it is intended to be used in 
Health systems in transition  Armenia 97
a flexible way to allow authors and editors to adapt it to their particular national 
context. The most recent template is available online at: http://www.euro.who.
int/en/who-we-are/partners/observatory/health-systems-in-transition-hit-series/
hit-template-2010.
Authors draw on multiple data sources for the compilation of HiT, ranging 
from national statistics, national and regional policy documents, and published 
literature. Furthermore, international data sources may be incorporated, such 
as those of the OECD and the World Bank. OECD Health Data contain over 
1200 indicators for the 34 OECD countries. Data are drawn from information 
collected by national statistical bureaux and health ministries. The World Bank 
provides World Development Indicators, which also rely on official sources.
In addition to the information and data provided by the country experts, 
the Observatory supplies quantitative data in the form of a set of standard 
comparative figures for each country, drawing on the European Health for 
All database. The Health for All database contains more than 600 indicators 
defined by the WHO Regional Office for Europe for the purpose of monitoring 
Health for All Policies in Europe. It is updated for distribution twice a year from 
various sources, relying largely upon official figures provided by governments, 
as well as health statistics collected by the technical units of the WHO Regional 
Office for Europe. The standard Health for All data have been officially 
approved by national governments. With its summer 2007 edition, the Health 
for All database started to take account of the enlarged EU of 27 Member States.
HiT authors are encouraged to discuss the data in the text in detail, including 
the standard figures prepared by the Observatory staff, especially if there are 
concerns about discrepancies between the data available from different sources.
A typical HiT consists of nine chapters.
1. Introduction: outlines the broader context of the health system, including 
geography and sociodemography, economic and political context, and 
population health.
2. Organization and governance: provides an overview of how the health 
system in the country is organized, governed, planned and regulated, as 
well as the historical background of the system; outlines the main actors 
and their decision-making powers; and describes the level of patient 
empowerment in the areas of information, choice, rights, complaints 
procedures, public participation and cross-border health care.
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3. Financing: provides information on the level of expenditure and the 
distribution of health spending across different service areas, sources of 
revenue, how resources are pooled and allocated, who is covered, what 
benefits are covered, the extent of user charges and other out-of-pocket 
payments, voluntary health insurance and how providers are paid.
4. Physical and human resources: deals with the planning and distribution of 
capital stock and investments, infrastructure and medical equipment; the 
context in which IT systems operate; and human resource input into the 
health system, including information on workforce trends, professional 
mobility, training and career paths.
5. Provision of services: concentrates on the organization and delivery 
of services and patient flows, addressing public health, primary care, 
secondary and tertiary care, day care, emergency care, pharmaceutical 
care, rehabilitation, long-term care, services for informal carers, palliative 
care, mental health care, dental care, complementary and alternative 
medicine, and health services for specific populations.
6. Principal health reforms: reviews reforms, policies and organizational 
changes; and provides an overview of future developments.
7. Assessment of the health system: provides an assessment based on the 
stated objectives of the health system, financial protection and equity 
in financing; user experience and equity of access to health care; health 
outcomes, health service outcomes and quality of care; health system 
efficiency; and transparency and accountability.
8. Conclusions: identifies key findings, highlights the lessons learned 
from health system changes; and summarizes remaining challenges and 
future prospects.
9. Appendices: includes references, useful web sites and legislation.
The quality of HiTs is of real importance since they inform policy-making 
and meta-analysis. HiTs are the subject of wide consultation throughout the 
writing and editing process, which involves multiple iterations. They are then 
subject to the following.
•  A rigorous review process (see the following section).
•  There are further efforts to ensure quality while the report is finalized 
that focus on copy-editing and proofreading.
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•  HiTs are disseminated (hard copies, electronic publication, translations 
and launches). The editor supports the authors throughout the production 
process and in close consultation with the authors ensures that all stages 
of the process are taken forward as effectively as possible.
One of the authors is also a member of the Observatory staff team and 
they are responsible for supporting the other authors throughout the writing 
and production process. They consult closely with each other to ensure that 
all stages of the process are as effective as possible and that HiTs meet the 
series standard and can support both national decision-making and comparisons 
across countries.
9.4 The review process
This consists of three stages. Initially the text of the HiT is checked, reviewed 
and approved by the series editors of the European Observatory. It is then 
sent for review to two independent academic experts, and their comments 
and amendments are incorporated into the text, and modifications are made 
accordingly. The text is then submitted to the relevant ministry of health or 
appropriate authority, and policy-makers within those bodies are restricted to 
checking for factual errors within the HiT.
9.5 About the authors
Erica Richardson is a Research Officer at the European Observatory on Health 
Systems and Policies, specializing in health system monitoring for countries of 
the former Soviet Union.

The Health Systems in Transition reviews
A series of the European Observatory on Health Systems 
and Policies
The Health Systems in Transition (HiT) country reviews provide an analytical description of each health care system and of reform initiatives in progress or under development. They aim to provide relevant comparative 
information to support policy-makers and analysts in the development of health 
systems and reforms in the countries of the WHO European Region and beyond. 
The HiT profiles are building blocks that can be used:
•  to learn in detail about different approaches to the financing, organization 
and delivery of health services;
•  to describe accurately the process, content and implementation of health 
reform programmes;
•  to highlight common challenges and areas that require more in-depth 
analysis; and
•  to provide a tool for the dissemination of information on health systems 
and the exchange of experiences of reform strategies between policy-
makers and analysts in countries of the WHO European Region.
How to obtain a HiT
All HiTs are available as PDF files at www.healthobservatory.eu, where you 
can also join our listserve for monthly updates of the activities of the European 
Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, including new HiTs, books in 
our co-published series with Open University Press, Policy briefs, Policy 
summaries, and the Eurohealth journal.
If you would like to order a paper copy of a HiT, 
please write to:
info@obs�euro�who�int
The 
publications of the
European Observatory on 
Health Systems and Policies
are available at
www.healthobservatory.eu

HiT country profiles published to date:
Albania (1999, 2002ag)
Andorra (2004)
Armenia (2001g, 2006, 2013)
Australia (2002, 2006)
Austria (2001e, 2006e)
Azerbaijan (2004g, 2010g)
Belarus (2008g)
Belgium (2000, 2007, 2010)
Bosnia and Herzegovina (2002g)
Bulgaria (1999, 2003b, 2007g, 2012b)
Canada (2005, 2013c)
Croatia (1999, 2006)
Cyprus (2004, 2012)
Czech Republic (2000, 2005g, 2009)
Denmark (2001, 2007g, 2012)
Estonia (2000, 2004gj, 2008)
Finland (2002, 2008)
France (2004cg, 2010)
Georgia (2002dg, 2009)
Germany (2000e, 2004eg)
Greece (2010)
Hungary (1999, 2004, 2011)
Iceland (2003)
Ireland (2009)
Israel (2003, 2009)
Italy (2001, 2009)
Japan (2009)
Kazakhstan (1999g, 2007g, 2012g)
Kyrgyzstan (2000g, 2005g, 2011g)
Latvia (2001, 2008, 2012)
Lithuania (2000, 2013)
Luxembourg (1999)
Malta (1999) 
Mongolia (2007)
Netherlands (2004g, 2010)
New Zealand (2001)
Norway (2000, 2006)
Poland (1999, 2005k, 2012)
Portugal (1999, 2004, 2007, 2011)
Republic of Korea (2009)
Republic of Moldova (2002g, 2008g, 2012)
Romania (2000f, 2008)
Russian Federation (2003g, 2011g)
Slovakia (2000, 2004, 2011)
Slovenia (2002, 2009)
Spain (2000h, 2006, 2010)
Sweden (2001, 2005, 2012)
Switzerland (2000)
Tajikistan (2000, 2010gl)
The former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia (2000, 2006)
Turkey (2002gi, 2011)
Turkmenistan (2000)
Ukraine (2004g, 2010g)
United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland (1999g)
United Kingdom (England) (2011)
United Kingdom (Northern Ireland) (2012)
United Kingdom (Scotland) (2012)
United Kingdom (Wales) (2012)
United States of America (2013)
Uzbekistan (2001g, 2007g)
Veneto Region, Italy (2012)
Key
All HiTs are available in English.
When noted, they are also available in other languages:
a Albanian
b Bulgarian
c French
d Georgian
e German
f Romanian
g Russian
h Spanish
i Turkish
j Estonian
k Polish
l Tajik
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